Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 79

Issue 2

Article 5

Spring 2022

Making Net Zero Matter
Albert C. Lin
University of California, Davis, School of Law, aclin@ucdavis.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Climate Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and
the Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Albert C. Lin, Making Net Zero Matter, 79 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 679 (2022).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol79/iss2/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Making Net Zero Matter
Albert C. Lin*
Abstract
In recent months, dozens of countries and thousands of
businesses have pledged to achieve net zero greenhouse gas
emissions. However, net zero often means different things to
different entities, and it is often uncertain how net zero
pledges—which set targets years or decades from the
present—will be met. This Article considers the motivations
behind net zero pledges, highlights the underappreciated role of
carbon removal in net zero efforts, and identifies mechanisms for
encouraging the accomplishment of net zero goals. Two key
strategies are essential to making net zero targets matter. First,
society should develop and implement accountability and
enforcement mechanisms to promote follow through on net zero
commitments. These mechanisms include disclosure standards,
benchmarks, contractual arrangements, and legal claims under
securities and consumer protection laws. Second, net zero pledges
should incorporate distinct targets for emissions reduction and
carbon removal. Carbon mitigation and carbon removal differ in
significant ways with respect to verifiability, permanence,
readiness, and risks. Distinguishing carbon mitigation and
carbon removal in net zero goals is essential to avoid
undermining efforts to achieve climate goals, shifting the
burdens of climate action to vulnerable populations or future
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generations, and increasing societal, health, and environmental
risks.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent months, net zero has become all the rage in
climate policy. Dozens of countries—representing over
two-thirds of global carbon emissions—have declared their
intent to achieve net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in
the coming decades.1 Hundreds of cities and over three thousand
businesses have joined Race to Zero, a global collection of net
zero commitments from entities responsible for a quarter of
global CO2 emissions.2 Many of the world’s best-known
1. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, NET ZERO BY 2050 32 (2021) [hereinafter
IEA, NET ZERO] (reporting that countries with net zero pledges account for
around 70 percent of global CO2 emissions); Net Zero Tracker, CLIMATE WATCH
[hereinafter Net Zero Tracker], https://perma.cc/V8RK-3U9Q (archived Jan.
16, 2022) (reporting that seventy-four parties, representing eighty-one
countries and 73.8 percent of global GHG emissions, have adopted net zero
targets).
2. See UNFCCC, Race to Zero Campaign, https://perma.cc/MS2F-SM2V
(archived Jan. 16, 2022) (reporting that “733 cities, 31 regions, 3,067
businesses, 173 of the biggest investors, and 622 Higher Education
Institutions” have joined the Race to Zero campaign); ALBERTO CARRILLO
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brands—such as Apple, Facebook, Ford, and McDonald’s—are
among the companies that have made net zero commitments.3
Net zero targets can take the form of firm commitments and
binding laws.4 They also may appear as aspirational statements
and nonbinding policy pledges.5 In theory, the achievement of
net zero targets can be measured and assessed more readily
than broad commitments to environmental sustainability.
Nonetheless, it is often uncertain how nations, cities, and
businesses will achieve net zero. Net zero commitments—which
set targets years or decades from the present—often lack detail
regarding implementation measures and interim goals.6
Furthermore, carrying out those commitments will not be easy.
It will require wholesale changes in production processes,
energy systems, transportation modes, and economic systems to
mitigate (i.e., reduce) GHG emissions.7 At a global level, net zero
will require significant levels of carbon removal from the
atmosphere to counterbalance residual GHG emissions.8
PINEDA ET AL., SCI. BASED TARGETS INITIATIVE, FOUNDATIONS FOR
SCIENCE-BASED NET-ZERO TARGET SETTING IN THE CORPORATE SECTOR 5 (2020)
[hereinafter SBTI] (same); DATA-DRIVEN ENVIROLAB & NEWCLIMATE INST.,
ACCELERATING NET ZERO 4 (2020) [hereinafter NCI, ACCELERATING NET ZERO]
(detailing the global shift towards net zero GHG emission pathways).
3. See NCI, ACCELERATING NET ZERO, supra note 2, at 13–14 (listing
McDonald’s, Apple, and Facebook as companies that have announced net zero
commitments); Leighton Schneider, Ford Announces New Carbon Neutral
Targets, ABC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/7CRJ-K5KD (describing
Ford’s goal to become carbon neutral by 2050).
4. See Kelly Levin et al., Designing and Communicating Net-Zero
Targets 7–8 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, July 2020) [hereinafter Levin
et al., Designing and Communicating] (listing the ways net zero targets are
established).
5. See id. at 8.
6. See NEWCLIMATE INST. & DATA-DRIVEN ENVIROLAB, NAVIGATING THE
NUANCES OF NET-ZERO TARGETS 1, 3 (2020) [hereinafter NCI, NAVIGATING THE
NUANCES] (stating that only “a limited number of subnational governments
and companies” have created action plans for their net zero goals and “[o]nly
33 percent of subnational governments’ and 8 percent of companies’ net-zero
targets include interim targets to chart a decarbonisation pathway”).
7. See Felix Schreyer et al., Common but Differentiated Leadership:
Strategies and Challenges for Carbon Neutrality by 2050 Across Industrialized
Economies, 15 ENV’T RES. LETTERS 114016, 2020, at 3.
8. See id. at 7–8 (projecting that carbon removal must compensate for
10 percent or more of 2020-level GHG emissions in the United States,
European Union, Japan, and Australia for each region to achieve carbon
neutrality by 2050).
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International policymakers have implicitly acknowledged this
fact but have yet to plan accordingly.9 Even national net zero
commitments will have to rely on carbon removal or carbon
credits, as will many subnational and private commitments.10
This Article considers the motivations behind net zero
pledges, highlights the underappreciated role of carbon removal
in net zero efforts, and identifies mechanisms for encouraging
the accomplishment of net zero goals.11 While net zero pledges
are increasingly important in the battle against climate change,
their meaning is often indeterminate and varied. Fleshing out
net zero commitments, including their scope, pathways to their
achievement, and reliance on carbon removal, is essential. To
ensure that sufficient carbon removal occurs without
undermining GHG mitigation efforts, policymakers and
corporations should set out distinct goals for emission reduction
and carbon removal. To hold companies accountable for net zero
pledges, governments and other actors should develop and
implement disclosure standards, benchmarks, contractual
arrangements, and other appropriate mechanisms. And to hold
governments accountable for their pledges, a range of litigation
tools may be necessary.
Part I offers background on net zero targets, including
efforts to mitigate climate change, potential methods to remove
CO2 from the atmosphere, and an overview of net zero
commitments by governments and private entities. Part II
explores whether these commitments are likely to contribute to
combating climate change by considering the motivations
leading to their adoption. Part III identifies various mechanisms
for reinforcing net zero pledges through transparency and
accountability measures, stakeholder and public pressure, and
litigation. Part IV turns to a basic question of net zero
design—whether net zero pledges should include distinct carbon

9. See Oliver Geden et al., Targeting Carbon Dioxide Removal in the
European Union, 19 CLIMATE POL’Y 487, 488 (2019). Even the European Union,
a leader in international climate policy, has been relatively silent on carbon
removal. Id. at 488.
10. See IEA, NET ZERO, supra note 1, at 34–36 (detailing the need for and
use of carbon offsets in net zero pledges).
11. For discussions of the broader question of designing and
implementing net zero targets, see Levin et al., supra note 4, and SBTI, supra
note 2.
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mitigation and carbon removal goals—and answers that
question affirmatively in light of important differences between
the two and the danger that carbon removal may undermine
carbon mitigation efforts.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND ON NET ZERO

Efforts to Mitigate Climate Change

Historically, climate change policy has concentrated on
mitigation—i.e., reducing or eliminating GHG emissions.12
Mitigation includes replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy
sources, adopting more energy efficient processes, and capturing
and storing emissions from industrial processes.13 Despite some
success in mitigation efforts, global GHG emissions continue to
rise—aside from a brief drop during the COVID-19
pandemic—and climate change effects continue to intensify.14
Current emissions are estimated at over fifty gigatons (Gt) of
carbon dioxide equivalent per year.15 Growing recognition of
climate change’s urgency has expanded support for the concept
of net zero emissions.16 In a net zero world, global GHG

12. See, e.g., Schreyer et al., supra note 7 (examining region-specific
mitigation strategies in four industrial countries).
13. See S. JULIO FRIEDMANN ET AL., NET-ZERO AND GEOSPHERIC RETURN
17–20 (2020).
14. See Benjamin Storrow, ‘Worrying Resurgence’: CO2 Rises After
Pandemic Dip, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 3, 2021, 6:50 AM), https://perma.cc/2W9NSEZM.
15. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2020 xiv (2020)
(reporting that in 2019 global GHG emissions reached around 52.4 gigatons of
equivalent carbon dioxide); see also U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP
REPORT 2021, at 5 fig.2.1 (2021) [hereinafter EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2021]
(graphing the rise in total GHG emissions from 1970 to 2020).
16. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 1. Net zero,
which typically refers to a balancing of emissions and removals of all GHGs,
is sometimes used interchangeably with the terms “carbon neutrality” and
“climate neutrality.” NCI, ACCELERATING NET ZERO, supra note 2, at 9.
However, net zero is easier to achieve than climate neutrality but more
difficult to achieve than carbon neutrality. Carbon neutrality refers to a
balancing of emissions and removals of carbon dioxide, the most significant
GHG. See SBTI, supra note 2, at 48 (noting that carbon neutrality and
“net-zero CO2 emissions” are analogous). Climate neutrality, which refers to
“a state where human activities result in no net effect on the climate system,”
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emissions for a given period would be counterbalanced by
removals of GHGs from the atmosphere during that same
period.17
The 2015 Paris Agreement established a baseline goal of
limiting average global temperature rise to 2°C and a further
goal of limiting temperature rise to 1.5°C.18 Achieving either of
these goals will require human society to achieve net zero
emissions during the twenty first century.19 The Paris
Agreement directly incorporates the net zero concept in its call
for parties “to undertake rapid reductions [in emissions] . . . so
as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second
half of this century.”20 Sinks include natural processes that
remove and store GHGs from the atmosphere, such as tree
growth, as well as manmade processes, such as underground
carbon storage.21 The Paris Agreement does not specify whether
the balance between emissions and removals is to be achieved
globally or nationally.22 However, stabilizing the global climate

requires net zero GHG emissions and avoidance of any bio-geophysical
changes to climate due to human activities. Id.
17. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 6
(“The concept of balancing emissions and removals is akin to reaching net-zero
emissions.”).
18. Adoption of the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change art. 2.1(a), Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
19. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL
WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 95 (2018) [hereinafter IPCC] (stating that “[l]imiting
warming to 1.5°C implies reaching net zero CO2 emissions globally around
2050”).
20. Paris Agreement art. 4.1, supra note 18. The 1992 U.N. Framework
Convention
on
Climate
Change
called
more
generally
for
“limiting . . . emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and
enhancing . . . greenhouse sinks and reservoirs.” United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change art. 4.2(a), May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No.
102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 (emphasis added).
21. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 6
(defining a sink as a “physical unit or process that removes and stores a GHG
from the atmosphere,” including photosynthesis and air capture).
22. See J. Fuglestvedt et al., Implications of Possible Interpretations of
“Greenhouse Gas Balance” in the Paris Agreement, 376 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. A
20160445, 2018, at 4 (discussing the various ways “balance” can be interpreted
in the Paris Agreement).
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system would at a minimum require a global balance.23 As such,
the growing recognition that achieving the 1.5°C goal likely
requires balancing carbon emissions and carbon removal by
205024 has spurred net zero pledges worldwide.25
Notwithstanding the slow progress in mitigation efforts to
date, economically and technologically feasible pathways to
reduce GHG emissions consistent with the Paris temperature
goals do exist.26 A 2021 National Academy of Sciences study
concluded, for example, that “[a] transition to a net-zero
economy in the United States by midcentury is technologically
feasible, with energy system costs as a share of U.S. gross
domestic product that have been manageable over the past
decade, but it is on the edge of feasibility.”27 Another study found
that countries representing over 99 percent of CO2 emissions
could achieve 80 percent renewable energy by 2030 and 100
23. See id. at 4. The existence of multiple GHGs and various potential
interpretations of “balance” complicate the task of determining whether the
specified balance has been achieved. See id. at 2–8.
24. IPCC, supra note 19, at 12. The IPCC is the United Nations body
responsible for assessing the science related to climate change. See
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, https://perma.cc/F8Q9KTWR (describing the IPCC’s creation and purpose).
25. See EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2021, supra note 15, at 18 (calling net zero
emission pledges a development emerging from the Paris Agreement’s goals);
ENERGY & CLIMATE INTEL. UNIT, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO 1, 4 (2019) [hereinafter
ECIU] (“‘[N]et zero’ is on the international agenda as an explicit indicator of
whether a nation, region, city or business is committed to delivering the Paris
Agreement.”); Oliver Geden & Felix Schenuit, Unconventional Mitigation:
Carbon Dioxide Removal as a New Approach in EU Climate Policy 9, 16 (2020)
(SWP Research Paper No. 8) (stating that the IPCC’s special report made it
increasingly apparent that actors are now discussing and deciding on net zero
targets).
26. See Mark Z. Jacobson et al., Impacts of Green New Deal Energy Plans
on Grid Stability, Costs, Jobs, Health, and Climate in 143 Countries, 1 ONE
EARTH 449, 449–50 (2019) (“[S]tudies among at least 11 independent research
groups have found that transitioning to 100% renewable energy in one or all
energy sectors, while keeping the electricity and/or heat grids stable at a
reasonable cost, is possible.”); AMOL PHADKE ET AL., 2035 REPORT 2 (2020)
(illustrating technical and economic feasibility of achieving 90 percent
carbon-free electricity in the United States by 2035); ERIC LARSON ET AL.,
NET-ZERO AMERICA: POTENTIAL PATHWAYS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IMPACTS (2d
ver. 2020), https://perma.cc/6NKS-MBYR (PDF); see also ECIU, supra note 25,
at 6 (noting analyses indicating that net zero by 2050 is feasible).
27. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., ACCELERATING
DECARBONIZATION OF THE U.S. ENERGY SYSTEM 12 (2021) [hereinafter NAS,
ACCELERATING DECARBONIZATION].
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percent renewable energy by 2050 while generating millions of
jobs, shrinking energy needs by more than half, and reducing
energy, health, and climate costs.28 As these assessments
suggest, the challenges are primarily political in nature:
societies have developed or are developing the technological
capacity to drastically reduce emissions at a reasonable cost but
must still put policies in place to facilitate the transition. Such
policies include measures to accelerate the shift from fossil fuels
to renewables, efficiency standards, investments in energy
infrastructure, and support for emerging low-carbon
technologies.29 These technologies could include carbon capture
and storage (CCS), which captures carbon emissions from fossil
fuel combustion and industrial processes before their release but
to date has had a limited role because of its relatively high
costs.30
B.

Carbon Removal

Net zero cannot be achieved through mitigation efforts
alone. Some GHG emissions—such as emissions from aviation
and shipping—will be very difficult to eliminate.31 Residual
GHG emissions will necessitate significant levels of carbon
removal from the atmosphere.32 An individual nation can
achieve net zero either by removing carbon at a level equivalent
to its residual emissions or by obtaining emission offsets that
reflect emission reductions outside of its boundaries.33 At the
28. Jacobson et al., supra note 26, at 449.
29. See NAS, ACCELERATING DECARBONIZATION, supra note 27, at 43–50
(detailing how deep decarbonization is technologically feasible if significant
efforts are made); see also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY
PERSPECTIVES 2020, at 26 (2021) [hereinafter IEA, ENERGY TECH] (concluding
that “[g]overnments have an outsized role to play in supporting transitions
towards net-zero emissions”).
30. GLOBAL CCS INST., GLOBAL STATUS OF CCS 2019, at 12 (2019),
https://perma.cc/CS8W-LR4K (PDF).
31. See Steven J. Davis et al., Net-Zero Emissions Energy Systems, 360
SCIENCE eaas9793, 2018, at 1 (noting difficulty in eliminating carbon
emissions from long-range transport and steel and cement production).
32. SBTI, supra note 2, at 7.
33. Id. The Science Based Targets Initiative uses the term “offset” to refer
either to “compensation measures,” which involve the reduction of emissions
outside of a company’s value chain, or “neutralisation measures,” which refer
to either CCS or carbon removal. Id. at 7, 17.
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global scale, however, emission offsets are unavailable. Simply
put, the less progress the international community makes on
mitigation, the more it will need to rely on carbon removal to
make up the difference. Even with aggressive mitigation,
proposed pathways for achieving net zero in the United States
suggest that carbon removal would have to offset 10–20 percent
of current GHG emissions.34 To achieve net zero globally, global
carbon removal levels similarly would have to expand on a
“mindboggling” scale.35
Natural processes, including plant growth and carbon
mineralization, remove carbon from the atmosphere.36 By
themselves, these gradual processes are insufficient to achieve
net zero emissions. Various techniques—sometimes dubbed
negative emission technologies—have been proposed to
accelerate these processes or to engineer the capture of GHGs
from the atmosphere.37 Virtually all these technologies aim to
remove CO2 and thus are commonly referred to as carbon dioxide
removal or carbon removal. Unlike mitigation, which reduces or
captures emissions prior to release into the atmosphere, carbon
removal takes place after CO2 is released.38 The various carbon
removal techniques, which face diverse constraints on their
34. See NAS, ACCELERATING DECARBONIZATION, supra note 27, at 25
(“Most plans would offset between 10 and 20 percent of current emissions by
negative CO2 emissions.”).
35. Matthias Honegger & David Reiner, The Political Economy of
Negative Emissions Technologies: Consequences for International Policy
Design, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 306, 308 (2018). See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, &
MED., NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION: A
RESEARCH AGENDA 9 (2019) [hereinafter NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS
TECHNOLOGIES] (estimating need to remove 10–20 Gt of CO2 per year globally).
36. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at
28– 31, 247 (stating that carbon is removed from the atmosphere through
enhanced photosynthesis and forest regrowth, as well as by carbon
mineralization that occurs naturally during the weathering of silicate
materials).
37. For a review of these technologies and their current technological
readiness, see NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35; Jan
C. Minx et al., Negative Emissions—Part 1: Research Landscape and
Synthesis, 13 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 063001, 2018; ROYAL SOC’Y, GREENHOUSE
GAS REMOVAL 11 (2017), https://perma.cc/Z7CQ-6T9U (PDF). The term
“greenhouse gas removal” is used interchangeably with “negative emissions
technologies.”
38. See Minx et al., supra note 37, at 4, 13 (attempting to clarify the
boundary between carbon dioxide removal and mitigation).

MAKING NET ZERO MATTER

689

potential large-scale deployment,39 fall into two basic categories:
nature-based techniques and engineered carbon removal.40
Generally speaking, nature-based techniques are more mature
but offer limited and less permanent carbon storage capacity,
whereas engineered carbon removal technologies are less
mature but have greater and more permanent carbon storage
potential.41
The most prominent nature-based techniques are forest
carbon management and soil carbon sequestration. Forest
carbon management includes conversion of unforested land to
forest—through afforestation and reforestation—and improved
management of existing forests to increase carbon stocks.42
These practices, which are already being implemented in some
places, offer relatively limited and potentially impermanent
carbon storage.43 Annual carbon storage capacity from forest
carbon management is estimated at 0.25 Gt CO2 in the United
States and 2.5 Gt CO2 globally, assuming deployment in a
manner that avoids large adverse impacts.44

39. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 316, 394; NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 7–8 (listing difficulties various NETs face
such as limited land availability, high cost, and unknown environmental
impacts).
40. See Minx et al., supra note 37, at 4 (stating that carbon dioxide
removal methods “involve the ocean, land and technical systems, including
such methods as iron fertilization, large-scale afforestation and direct capture
of CO2 from the atmosphere using engineered chemical means”).
41. See id. at 12 (graphing the costs and benefits of carbon dioxide
removal methods).
42. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 89
(detailing forest carbon management techniques).
43. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 343 (describing afforestation and
reforestation as limited by “constraints related to land use” and having limited
potential over time due to saturation of forests); Albert C. Lin, Carbon Dioxide
Removal After Paris, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 540–41 (2018) [hereinafter Lin,
Carbon Dioxide Removal] (stating that afforestation and reforestation offer
only short-term carbon storage, reduce albedo, and have limited carbon
storage potential). For a definition of afforestation and reforestation, as well
as “forest management that enhances tree growth” and “prevention of
degradation and deforestation,” see G. Cornelis van Kooten, Forest Carbon
Offsets and Carbon Emissions Trading: Problems of Contracting, 75 FOREST
POL’Y & ECON. 83, 84 (2017).
44. NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 6, 112,
fig.3.1.
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Soil carbon sequestration refers to land management
practices that increase carbon content in the soil. This mature
technique generates a co-benefit of improved soil productivity
but faces limitations in permanence and scalability.45 Annual
carbon storage potential from improved cropland and grassland
management is estimated at a modest 0.25 Gt CO2 in the United
States and 3 Gt CO2 globally.46 Soil carbon sequestration can be
enhanced by amending soils with biochar—organic material
heated in the absence of carbon. Estimates of biochar’s potential
to store carbon vary and may depend on biochar type, soil type,
and environmental and management conditions.47
Given the relatively limited capacity of nature-based
techniques to store carbon, significant levels of engineered
carbon removal will be necessary to achieve Paris’s goals.48
Engineered carbon removal techniques incorporate substantial
technological innovation and include bioenergy with carbon
capture and storage (BECCS), direct air capture and storage
(DACS), and enhanced weathering.49 BECCS combines the
combustion of biomass at power stations to produce energy with
the capture of CO2 generated during combustion and its storage
45. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 345 (reviewing the literature on soil
carbon sequestration and biochar); NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES,
supra note 35, at 123 (detailing the co-benefits of soil carbon sequestration
practices); NCI, ACCELERATING NET ZERO, supra note 2, at 3–4 (discussing soil
carbon sequestration).
46. NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 6, 112,
fig.3.1.
47. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 345 (evaluating research on soil carbon
sequestration and biochar); Sabine Fuss et al., Negative Emissions—Part 2:
Costs, Potentials and Side Effects, 13 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 063002, 2018, at 26
[Fuss et al., Negative Emissions] (suggesting that “a lower range of 0.3–2.0
GtCO2 yr-1 by 2050 seems plausible”).
48. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 8–9,
13 (“If the goals for climate and economic growth are to be achieved, negative
emissions technologies will likely need to play a large role.”).
49. See MATT PIOTROWSKI & CLAIRE LANGLEY, CLIMATE ADVISERS,
TECHNOLOGICAL CARBON REMOVAL: RECENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRENDS
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2019), https://perma.cc/729S-JGDF (PDF) (detailing
carbon dioxide removal techniques); ETHAN L. ELKIND ET AL., CAPTURING
OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND POLICY SOLUTIONS TO ACCELERATE ENGINEERED
CARBON REMOVAL IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/PJ3E-3996 (PDF)
(stating that carbon dioxide removal techniques can include “bioengineered
approaches or enhancement of natural carbon sinks” as well as “engineered
options”).
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in geologic reservoirs.50 Requiring significant amounts of land
and water, BECCS has yet to achieve commercial deployment
because of its high cost and lack of infrastructure.51
Nonetheless, estimates suggest a potential for BECCS to store
3.5–5.2 Gt CO2 globally each year by 2050.52
DACS projects would capture CO2 from the air via chemical
processes and store it in geologic reservoirs.53 These facilities
would require relatively little land, can be located flexibly, and
offer potentially immense storage capacity.54 The technology is
currently the subject of several demonstration projects but is not
ready for deployment.55 DACS’s energy requirements result in
substantially higher overall costs than other carbon removal
techniques, though further research and development could
bring these costs down.56
Enhanced weathering involves spreading ground-up rocks
on land or in the ocean to facilitate chemical reactions that
absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.57 Potential limitations of

50. See NCI, ACCELERATING NET ZERO, supra note 2, at 4.
51. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 342 (stating that incentives for ramping
up BECCS are weak and detailing the high costs of creating BECCS
infrastructure); Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal, supra note 43, at 537–39
(stating that BECCS “is far from ready for large-scale deployment” in part
because carbon capture and storage has not reached commercial scale due to
its cost).
52. NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 7, 154.
53. IPCC, supra note 19, at 346.
54. See id.
55. GLOBAL CCS INST., GLOBAL STATUS OF CCS 2021, at 59 (2021),
https://perma.cc/WL2R-2N8W (PDF).
56. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 346 (stating there are some optimistic
outlooks that DACS may be brought to scale); NCI, ACCELERATING NET ZERO,
supra note 2, at 4 (stating that basic science innovations are important factors
in “expanding the scope of approaches to direct air capture”); NAS, NEGATIVE
EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 232 (discussing the DACS
research needed).
57. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 345. Enhanced weathering is a
subcategory of carbon mineralization, which encompasses various potential
methods of storing CO2 in carbonate minerals. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 304 (explaining the costs and benefits of
“combined mineral capture from air and solid storage”). Another subcategory,
in situ carbon mineralization, is “a largely speculative” technique in which
CO2-bearing fluids would be circulated through underground rock formations.
Id. at 249, 273 (defining and explaining the scientific process of in situ carbon
mineralization).
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enhanced weathering, which has been the subject of limited
study, include cost, environmental impacts, and scalability.58
The practical storage capacity of enhanced weathering is
uncertain in light of its technological immaturity.59
Achieving net zero goals, which will require substantial
amounts of carbon removal, would only stabilize atmospheric
GHG concentrations.60 Drawing down excess CO2 levels in the
atmosphere will require even greater levels of carbon
removal—i.e., net negative emissions.61 But carbon removal’s
ability to compensate for inadequate mitigation is not
boundless. As explained later, limitations of scale, efficacy, cost,
and sustainability are associated with each carbon removal
technique in varying degrees.62
C.

Net Zero

Net zero is not only a global ambition but increasingly a
target for governments and private actors. Net zero planning
can guide carbon mitigation and removal and establish criteria

58. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 345 (listing the costs and “side effects” of
enhanced weathering, which include the release of metals and increased pH
in bodies of water); NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35,
at 14 (explaining the high costs and underexplored technologies of carbon
mineralization and direct air capture); Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal, supra
note 43, at 541 (noting the “possible ecological consequences” and uncertainty
“of enhanced weathering”).
59. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 6–7
(displaying the estimated cost, potential CO2 removal, and limiting factors of
different negative emission technologies).
60. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 17 (“[Carbon dioxide removal] would be
used to compensate for residual emissions and, in most cases, achieve net
negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C following a peak.”).
61. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 4
(explaining that scenarios for achieving 1.5°C require that “emissions do not
stop declining at net zero—they ultimately become net negative”); IPCC, supra
note 19, at 17 (describing the different effects of large scale application of
carbon dioxide removal techniques).
62. See infra Part IV.B.2; see also M.J. MACE ET AL., GOVERNING
LARGE-SCALE CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL: ARE WE READY? 14 (2018),
https://perma.cc/9F6G-GMBV (PDF) (explaining that using various carbon
removal techniques is necessary to reduce the impacts of their limitations and
risks).
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for measuring performance, while allowing for adjustments as
circumstances change and more information arises.63
Whether invoked by governments or private entities, net
zero can take on different meanings. An entity may apply its net
zero target to a specific sector or product.64 Some targets
encompass only those emissions arising within a jurisdiction’s
boundaries or a company’s operations (commonly referred to as
“Scope 1 emissions”).65 Some companies include—in addition to
Scope 1 emissions—emissions relating to the company’s use of
grid-supplied energy (“Scope 2 emissions”), as well as emissions
generated by the company’s supply chain and the transport, use,
and disposal of the company’s products (“Scope 3 emissions”).66
Net zero targets also vary in terms of whether an entity intends
to achieve its target on its own or by relying on carbon credits
that reflect emissions reductions or carbon removal by other
actors.67 In light of the multiple ways of defining net zero,
transparency is essential to understanding each target, holding
entities accountable, and making meaningful progress in
addressing climate change.68

63. Cf. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 413–15 (1989) (discussing strengths of
goal-oriented legislation).
64. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 22 (explaining
that companies’ net zero goals “do not necessarily apply to companies’ full
emissions”).
65. Id. at 9.
66. Id. at 9 tbl.1. See WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, NET-ZERO CHALLENGE:
THE SUPPLY CHAIN OPPORTUNITY 7 (2021) [hereinafter WEF] (explaining and
illustrating the differences between Scope 1, 2, and 3). For governments, Scope
3 emissions include emissions outside a jurisdiction’s boundaries that result
from activities within those boundaries. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES,
supra note 6, at 9 tbl.1 (illustrating the differences between subnational and
corporate actors in regard to Scope 1, 2, and 3).
67. See IEA, NET ZERO, supra note 1, at 34 (explaining that “some pledges
allow GHG mitigation that occurs outside a country’s borders to be counted
towards the net zero target”); NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at
47 (exploring concerns raised by use of carbon offsets).
68. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 58
(“Transparency can facilitate accountability and positive pressure for target
quality.”).
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1.

National Net Zero Commitments

Government net zero commitments are consistent with, but
not required by, the Paris Agreement. The agreement reflects a
bottom-up approach to climate mitigation: rather than imposing
a top-down mandate that parties reduce their GHG emissions,
it allows each party to declare its own “Nationally Determined
Contribution” (NDC).69 National net zero targets are consistent
with the Paris approach in that they involve pledges, voluntarily
made and individually determined, by each nation of its
contribution to addressing climate change.70 To avoid shifting
responsibility to other nations, a national net zero target would
balance GHG emissions from sources within that country with
GHGs removed by sinks within that country.71
Although national and subnational governments’ net zero
targets may be enshrined in legislation, most targets so far have
taken the form of nonbinding policy goals.72 The European
Union and Japan have committed to achieve net zero GHGs by
2050.73 China has pledged to become carbon neutral by 2060.74
69. Paris Agreement art. 3, supra note 18.
70. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 8
(noting that several countries have incorporated net zero targets into their
NDCs under the Paris Agreement).
71. See id. at 6 (describing the differences between a country’s net zero
emissions levels with and without international transfers of GHG mitigation).
72. See IEA, NET ZERO, supra note 1, at 32 (explaining that out of the
forty-four countries with net zero emission pledges, “ten countries have made
meeting their net zero target a legal obligation”); Levin et al., Designing and
Communicating, supra note 4, at 2, 7–8 (listing the countries that have made
net zero emissions pledges through either law, strategy, policy, or a collective
commitment); ECIU, supra note 25, at 11 (counting countries, states, regions,
cities, and companies that have made net zero emission commitments).
National net zero commitments are tracked at https://eciu.net/netzerotracker.
73. See European Commission Press Release IP/20/335, Committing to
Climate-Neutrality By 2050: Commission Proposes European Climate Law
and Consults on The European Climate Pact (Mar. 4, 2020),
https://perma.cc/SPZ5-2JUF (noting EU’s existing political commitment and
describing proposed European Climate Law); Simon Denyer & Akiko
Kashiwagi, Japan, World’s Third Largest Economy, Vows to Become Carbon
Neutral by 2050, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/5R7V-CGBF.
74. See Somini Sengupta, China, in Pointed Message to U.S., Tightens Its
Climate Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/ZYR9-AW8Y
(last updated Nov. 13, 2020) (“President Xi Jinping of China pledged on
Tuesday that his country would adopt much stronger climate targets and
achieve what he called ‘carbon neutrality before 2060.’”).
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The United States has set a goal of achieving net zero emissions
by 2050,75 and its 2021 “Long Term Strategy” describes
necessary technological transformations as well as possible
pathways for achieving that goal.76 States and cities
representing 35 percent of the U.S. population have adopted net
zero targets.77
Thus far, net zero declarations have included few concrete
details or credible plans on how nations will achieve their
targets or counter residual GHG emissions.78 Some countries
plan to rely on carbon offsets in order to achieve net zero.79 Saudi
Arabia, for example, intends to offset continued oil production
with carbon removal.80 Many countries with net zero targets
have simply pledged to balance emissions and removals rather
than establishing distinct targets for GHG emissions reductions

75. See Exec. Order No. 14,008, § 201, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Feb. 1, 2021)
(describing the United States’ “government-wide approach to the climate
crisis”).
76. See U.S. Dep’t of State & Exec. Off. of the President, The Long-Term
Strategy of the United States: Pathways to Net-Zero Greenhouse Gas
Emissions by 2050, at 5–6, 17–24 (2021) [hereinafter Long-Term Strategy].
77. See Full Committee Hearing to Examine Development and
Deployment of Large-Scale Carbon Dioxide Management Technologies Before
the S. Comm. on Energy & Nat. Res., 116th Cong. 4 (2020), (statement of
Ernest J. Moniz, President and CEO of Energy Futures Initiative, Inc.),
https://perma.cc/XDN4-25FF.
78. See IEA, NET ZERO, supra note 1, at 34 (explaining how “few net zero
pledges are supported by detailed policies and firm routes to implementation”);
Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 21. For example, Australia’s plan to
achieve net zero by 2050 has been criticized as “mostly magical thinking”
because of its heavy reliance on largely untested technologies and on hydrogen
made from fossil fuels. Damien Cave, Australia Pledges ‘Net Zero’ Emissions
by 2050. Its Plan Makes That Hard to Believe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://perma.cc/W2L3-NTG7 (last updated Nov. 3, 2021) (describing the
Australian government’s process of finalizing its emissions plan and
technological approach to reaching its goals).
79. See IEA, ENERGY TECH, supra note 29, at 362 (listing Sweden,
Norway, Chile, and Switzerland as countries planning to use “international
carbon offsets to meet their targets”).
80. See Sara Schonhardt, Saudi Arabia’s Climate Plan Relies on More Oil,
CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 8, 2021, 6:30 AM), https://perma.cc/88KZ-Q78W
(explaining Saudi Arabia’s plan to implement carbon capture technologies so
that it can continue to produce oil).
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and GHG removals.81 Among the few with distinct targets are
Finland, which has announced a net zero target for 2035 and set
a separate sub-target for CO2 removal,82 and Sweden, whose
2045 net zero goal includes a separate target of reducing GHG
emissions by 85 percent.83
Some nations have begun to identify the carbon removal
techniques they intend to rely on to achieve net zero. Several EU
nations plan to rely primarily on land-based carbon removal
(forestry).84 France intends to rely on BECCS to remove ten
megatons of carbon per year by 2050.85 China anticipates
substantial deployment of nature-based carbon removal,
including tree planting and wetlands restoration.86 However, it
will likely need significant levels of CCS87 and engineered
81. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at
22– 23 app. B (listing countries and comparing their coverage of GHGs,
domestic sectors, and target years).
82. See Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 22 (explaining Finland’s
“net-zero target for 2035 as an intermediate step towards net negative
emissions”).
83. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 15
(“Sweden has also set a target for emissions from activities within the country
in 2045 to be at least 85 percent below 1990 levels.”). The country is
considering carbon removal or international offsets to make up for the
remaining 15 percent of its emissions. See Felix Schenuit et al., Carbon
Dioxide Removal Policy in the Making: Assessing Developments in 9 OECD
Cases, 3 FRONTIERS IN CLIMATE, March 2021, at 7 [hereinafter Carbon Dioxide
Removal] (explaining Sweden’s target structure for emission reduction).
84. See Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 22–23 (listing Finland and
Sweden as examples of such countries).
85. See id. at 22 (stating that France is the only EU member with “a
technological CO2 removal method”).
86. See Beijing’s Plan to Reach Carbon-Neutral Goal Raises Questions,
CLIMATEWIRE
(Oct.
13,
2020),
[hereinafter
Beijing’s
Plan]
https://perma.cc/JJ73-9HSY (describing Beijing’s projects to plant “billions of
trees” and to restore “hundreds of thousands of hectares of wetlands”);
Ranping Song, 4 Questions About China’s New Climate Commitments, WORLD
RES. INST. (Sept. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/JZ55-KQPJ (arguing that “China
will need to fully unleash the potential of afforestation, wetland restoration
and other natural-based solutions”).
87. CCS, typically classified as a form of carbon mitigation, shares
characteristics of both mitigation and carbon removal. See EVE TAMME,
CARBON REMOVAL WITH CCS TECHNOLOGIES 2 (2021), https://perma.cc/7U5AWSHS (PDF) (“Carbon capture and storage (CCS) offers climate change
mitigation solutions by removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the point sources,
or the atmosphere, and storing it underground.”). Unlike carbon removal, CCS
captures carbon before it is released into the atmosphere. Emily Rhode, Carbon
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carbon removal as well.88 The United States has pointed to both
nature-based and engineered carbon removal techniques as
“critical” for achieving net zero.89
Although the United States has yet to adopt a detailed net
zero strategy, expert analyses suggest that it would likely
include dramatically expanding renewable energy, electrifying
transportation and buildings, replacing fossil fuels with
hydrogen and other zero-carbon fuels, managing forests and
farmlands with a focus on carbon, reducing emissions of
non-CO2 GHGs, and increasing energy and materials
efficiency.90 These analyses generally acknowledge the need to
deploy carbon removal technologies to offset residual
emissions.91 One study by Princeton University researchers
Capture
and
Storage
(CCS)
Pros
and
Cons,
TREEHUGGER,
https://perma.cc/5U5Y-2Z86 (last updated Aug. 13, 2021) (describing the
benefits of CCS as being able to eliminate emissions at the source). However,
CCS differs from conventional mitigation in that it assumes the generation of
GHGs and stores those gases geologically. See id. (stating the biggest
advantage of CCS is its permanent storage of gases underground in geological
formations). In this regard, CCS resembles engineered carbon removal—and
indeed involves the same geological storage processes as BECCS and DACS.
See TAMME, supra, at 5.
88. See Beijing’s Plan, supra note 86 (arguing that “it’s unlikely that
China . . . can get to net zero without some sort of carbon dioxide removal”).
89. Long-Term Strategy, supra note 76, at 46.
90. See NAS, ACCELERATING DECARBONIZATION, supra note 27, at 30–31,
48–49 (listing recommendations to Congress); SUSTAINABLE DEV. SOLS.
NETWORK, ZERO CARBON ACTION PLAN 2 (2020) [hereinafter ZCAP]
The key components required for the new green-growth model
presented in this document include: (1) Rapid upscaling of
renewable energy; (2) Electrification; (3) Transition to hydrogen,
advanced biofuels, and other clean fuels; (4) Sustainable Forest and
agricultural lands; (5) Reduced material wastes through
Sustainable Materials Management; (6) Rejuvenation of the
industrial heartland of America with a special focus on the
Appalachian Region and the Midwest; (7) Government-backed
financing, investments, and regulatory support; and (8) a national
Research, Development, Demonstration and Deployment (RDD&D)
strategy.
LARSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 9–10 (listing the “six pillars [that] are needed
to support the transition to net-zero”); James H. Williams et al.,
Carbon-Neutral Pathways for the United States, AGU ADVANCES, Nov. 12,
2021, at 2.
91. See LARSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 10, 257 (identifying carbon
capture and storage and enhanced land sinks as two of six key pillars for
achieving net zero); Williams, supra note 90, at 17.
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projects a need for 0.9–1.7 Gt/CO2 storage per year by 2050
involving thousands of injection wells.92 Another study
nonetheless warns that “it is highly uneconomic to achieve
carbon neutrality through a strategy of continuing high levels of
gross CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels that are offset by
[carbon removal].”93 Achieving net zero in the United States can
happen at a modest cost but will require dramatic changes in
infrastructure and technologies.94
2.

Corporate Net Zero Commitments

Net zero commitments by private actors have also grown in
number and importance. Though these commitments are
voluntary and legally unenforceable, their achievement could
make a sizeable contribution to addressing climate change.95
Corporations that have made net zero pledges represent a
wide range of sectors. Taken together, these companies total
over $12 trillion in revenue and nearly twenty-five million
employees, and have a carbon footprint exceeding 3.5 Gt
GHGs.96 Corporate net zero pledges vary widely in terms of their
timelines, scope of activities covered, and plans for
implementation.97 Many pledges focus on the year 2050, but
92. LARSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 10 (describing the necessary methods
to capture and store enough carbon). The carbon would be captured not only
from industrial facilities and gas-fired power plants, but also biomass-fired
power plants and direct air capture facilities. Id. at 231 (discussing the
different methods of capturing carbon).
93. ZCAP, supra note 90, at 45.
94. See Williams, supra note 90, at 7–10 (estimating such costs as less
than 1 percent of GDP).
95. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 20 (noting that
“companies pursuing net-zero emissions have a footprint greater than 3.5
gigatonnes of GHG annual emissions, which is more than India’s annual
emissions”).
96. See id. at 19–20 (describing companies’ massive impact on the
environment); Maitane Sardon, Total Pledges Net-Zero Emissions by 2050,
WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/U4KF-TCCY (analyzing pledges
made by European oil companies). For a list detailing many of these corporate
pledges, see Carbon Removal Corporate Action Tracker, INST. FOR CARBON
REMOVAL L. & POL’Y (May 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/LZ5H-2L58.
97. See SBTI, supra note 2, at 5, 14–15 (providing a science-based net zero
standard for companies and financial institutions); NCI, NAVIGATING THE
NUANCES, supra note 6, at 25 fig.6 (presenting overview of different net zero
approaches).
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some specify earlier or later dates.98 Some pledges cover
emissions associated with a company’s operations and exclude
emissions associated with its supply chain or use of its
products.99 Moreover, some corporate strategies rely on the
purchase of offsets representing emissions reductions by a third
party, potentially obscuring a company’s own failure to
decarbonize.100
A handful of companies have offered some detail on how
they expect to reach net zero, with many intending to rely
significantly on CCS or nature-based carbon removal, and a few
beginning to invest in engineered carbon removal.101 For
example, Apple aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2030 by
reducing its emissions by 75 percent and “investing in forests
and other nature-based solutions around the world to remove
carbon from the atmosphere.”102 Similarly, Amazon plans to rely
on reforestation projects to achieve net zero by 2040.103 Microsoft
promises to become carbon negative by 2030 and remove all the
carbon it has ever emitted by 2050, and it has joined the oil

98. See NCI, ACCELERATING NET-ZERO, supra note 2, at 15 (providing
examples of companies with different target dates such as 2020, 2030, 2050,
and 2100); IEA, ENERGY TECH, supra note 29, at 365 box 7.2 (describing
corporate net zero emission targets).
99. See, e.g., Sardon, supra note 96 (discussing net zero pledges by major
European oil companies).
100. See SBTI, supra note 2, at 24 (explaining that a strategy of relying on
carbon offsets “is not consistent with reaching a state that is consistent with
reaching net-zero emissions at the planetary level”); NCI, NAVIGATING THE
NUANCES, supra note 6, at 27, 47 (warning against the limitations of claiming
carbon neutrality by offsetting).
101. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 52 (noting that
offset credits from forestry-related projects are “by far the most popular type
of offset credit on the voluntary market”); Brad Plumer & Christopher
Flavelle, Businesses Aim to Pull Greenhouse Gases from the Air. It’s a Gamble,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/9P4J-U2FS (last updated Oct. 10,
2021) (describing the widespread corporate interest in carbon removal and
discussing some of its risks).
102. Press Release, Apple, Apple Commits to be 100 Percent Carbon
Neutral for Its Supply Chain and Products by 2030 (July 21, 2020),
https://perma.cc/P5AQ-H8P7; see also Somini Sengupta & Veronica Penney,
Big Tech Has a Big Climate Problem. Now, It’s Being Forced to Clean Up, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/ASW7-PE6R (describing Apple’s pledge
and the critiques from climate advocates).
103. See Sengupta & Penney, supra note 102 (“Amazon announced last
September its bid to be carbon-neutral by 2040.”).
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industry’s Northern Lights initiative, a project to capture 100
million tons of industrial carbon emissions and to store it in
subsea reservoirs off the coast of Norway.104 The company also
has expressed interest in afforestation, reforestation, soil carbon
sequestration, BECCS, and DACS.105 And United Airlines, as
part of its commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050,
announced a multimillion-dollar investment to support DACS
technology development.106
Utility and energy companies’ net zero pledges are of
particular interest because of their carbon-intensive operations.
To reach net zero by 2050, the Southern Company, an electric
utility, plans to rely on CCS, DACS, and afforestation.107 Duke
Energy and Entergy likewise promise to achieve net zero by
2050 through a combination of existing techniques and new
technologies.108 Notwithstanding such pledges, a consultant’s

104. See Stanley Reed, Europe’s Big Oil Companies Are Turning Electric,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/2LEA-UBQA (discussing the oil
industry’s turn towards cleaner energy); Lorence Heikell, Northern Lights Is
Innovating for the Future of Carbon Transport and Storage, MICROSOFT (Oct.
14, 2020), https://perma.cc/B629-GSX3 (announcing the partnership between
Microsoft and Northern Lights); Lucas Joppa et al., Comment, Microsoft’s
Million-Tonne CO2-Removal Purchase—Lessons for Net Zero, 597 NATURE 629,
629 (2021) (discussing Microsoft’s commitment to reducing its emissions by
paying for 1.3 million tons of CO2 to be removed from the atmosphere).
105. See David Roberts, Microsoft’s Astonishing Climate Change Goals,
Explained, VOX (July 30, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://perma.cc/VL93-8AND
(describing the company as “setting new standards” and discussing the
breadth of its commitment).
106. See United Makes Bold Environmental Commitment Unmatched by
Any Airline; Pledges 100% Green by Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 100%
by 2050, CISION (Dec. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/S6CL-ZGDT (“United
becomes the first airline in the world to announce a commitment to invest in
Direct Air Capture technology.”).
107. See Kristi E. Swartz, Southern Company Commits to Net-Zero CO2
Emissions by 2050, ENERGYWIRE (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/WT2LHLCT (“The company also is interested in so-called direct air capture, which
removes carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and afforestation, which adds
trees to large areas where they did not previously grow.”).
108. See Edward Klump, Entergy Rolls out 2050 Net-Zero Plan,
ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/DZ4N-E8MY (explaining
Entergy’s plan to invest in renewables and explore new technologies such as
battery storage and carbon capture); Duke Energy Aims to Achieve Net-Zero
Carbon Emissions by 2050, DUKE ENERGY (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://perma.cc/GDJ7-62JS (describing Duke Energy’s plan to reduce carbon
emissions and invest in technology research).
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report
found
“significant
gaps
between
[utilities’]
decarbonization targets and the scheduled fossil-fuel plant
retirements, renewable additions, and flexibility requirements
needed” to achieve net zero.109
Even oil companies have begun to jump on the net zero
bandwagon. Several European-based oil companies have made
net zero pledges and initiated a shift in their business models
away from fossil fuels.110 Shell’s net zero pledge relies on
“storing away emissions that cannot be avoided, either through
nature or using the technology that already exists to capture
and store away CO2.”111 BP’s strategy to achieve net zero by 2050
includes “building scale in renewables and bioenergy [and]
seeking early positions in hydrogen and CCUS.”112 BP’s strategy
does not explicitly mention carbon removal, but the company
likely will have to depend on CCS and nature-based carbon
removal to achieve net zero.113
109. Stanley Porter et al., Utility Decarbonization Strategies: Renew,
(Sept.
21,
2020),
Reshape,
and
Refuel
to
Zero,
DELOITTE
https://perma.cc/8XNS-XM3T.
110. See Nicholas Kusnetz, Two U.S. Oil Companies Join Their European
Counterparts in Making Net Zero Pledges, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 12,
2020), https://perma.cc/7LQZ-LQX4 (describing Occidental Petroleum and
ConocoPhillips’ net zero pledges as the first from American oil companies but
different from the pledges made by European oil companies). Exemplifying the
more limited approach of U.S. oil majors, Chevron has expressed an
“aspiration” to achieve net zero emissions—excluding Scope 3 emissions—by
2050. CHEVRON, CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE: ADVANCING A LOWER CARBON
FUTURE 2, 38 (2021), https://perma.cc/Y8HH-XUTU (PDF).
111. A Net-Zero Emissions Energy Business, SHELL (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://perma.cc/GVH7-SPEM. Shell has announced a short-term carbon
reduction target, as well as an intent to set future targets annually. See
DELOITTE, THE 2030 DECARBONIZATION CHALLENGE: THE PATH TO THE FUTURE
OF ENERGY 15 (2020), https://perma.cc/4574-W85G (PDF) (“[Shell] recently
announced a short-term target of reducing its net carbon footprint by 3% to 4%
by the end of 2022, along with its intention to set targets annually, with each
year’s target covering either a three or five-year period.”).
112. Our Strategy, BP., https://perma.cc/3839-C6X2; Steven Mufson, BP
Built Its Business on Oil and Gas. Now Climate Change Is Taking It Apart,
WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/HT6L-YBR4 (describing BP’s
“increase in spending on low-carbon energy”).
113. See Matt McGrath, Climate Change: Study Pours Cold Water on Oil
Company Net Zero Claims, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/XBH2EP52 (“[A]ll of the plans . . . are, to some degree, dependent on carbon capture
and storage (CCS) technology and nature-based solutions such as planting
trees.”).
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Most corporate pledges have not been accompanied by the
disclosure of detailed strategies for achieving net zero.114
Granted, possible pathways to net zero are riddled with
uncertainty, and companies need time to figure out how to
accomplish their pledges. Skeptics nonetheless worry that
corporate net zero pledges may constitute little more than
greenwashing.115 For these pledges to have a meaningful
impact, they must be subject to careful scrutiny, and the
companies that make them must be held accountable for failing
to fulfill them.
II.

ARE NET ZERO PLEDGES LIKELY TO MATTER?

Private net zero commitments are voluntary. Governmental
net zero commitments are largely nonbinding, and even those
that have been incorporated into law may not be enforceable.116
Whether binding or not, net zero commitments may turn out to
be little more than political and economic posturing unless
backed by concrete plans and efforts. By setting goals without
specifying how to achieve them, governments and private actors
may duck difficult choices and costly actions.117 In light of their
potential limitations, will net zero commitments matter?
Public and private actors’ motivations for making net zero
pledges, examined below, shed light on this critical question.
Although net zero pledges may constitute a blend of
greenwashing and sincere commitments to addressing climate
change, identifying mechanisms to hold actors accountable for
their pledges will be essential.
114. See David Iaconangelo, “The Math Doesn’t Yet Add Up.” Net-Zero
Plans Fall Short, ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 24, 2020, 6:21 AM),
https://perma.cc/9BSZ-YY4C (“Many of the largest companies in the United
States, including major energy firms, are not seriously planning to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions or lack sufficiently detailed net-zero road
maps . . . .”).
115. See Roberts, supra note 105 (describing climate advocates’ hesitation
to trust corporate commitments).
116. See Rubin, supra note 63, at 415 (suggesting that courts generally are
“designed to adjudicate claims of right, not achieve broad social policy
results”).
117. See David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of
the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 747–48 (1983) (discussing how
Congress’s setting of ambitious goals in Clean Air Act allowed it to evade
difficult policy questions).
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Motivations for Private Pledges

Private entities’ net zero targets exemplify private
environmental
governance—“actions
taken
by
non-governmental entities that are designed to achieve
traditionally governmental ends.”118 Companies may apply
private environmental standards not only to themselves but also
to suppliers, borrowers, and other entities with which they
interact, sometimes reaching into different sectors and across
national borders.119 Investment manager BlackRock Inc., for
example, could influence hundreds of other companies through
its pledge to require companies it invests in to develop plans to
achieve net zero by 2050.120 Major lenders such as Citigroup,
Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Barclays,
and HSBC have made similar pledges with respect to companies
that borrow from them.121 Net zero pledges that include Scope 3
emissions, such as pledges made by Unilever and GE, similarly
extend beyond narrowly defined corporate boundaries.122
118. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146 (2013) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private].
119. See id. at 156–58 (explaining supply chain contracting and providing
examples).
120. See Avery Ellfeldt, BlackRock Puts Muscle Behind Push for Net Zero,
CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 19, 2021, 6:42 AM), https://perma.cc/Q85R-VR3K
(reporting on the firm’s threat to vote against company directors who fail to
address company contributions to climate change).
121. See Avery Ellfeldt, Citi Goes Net Zero. Who’s Next?, CLIMATEWIRE
(Mar. 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/LA2W-GTSM (describing Citi’s pledge to
“eliminate planet-warming emissions associated with their financing
activities” by 2050); Avery Ellfeldt, Bank of America Pledges to Hit Net Zero
by 2050, CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/KZK8-VUHH (listing
Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley as banks committed
to aligning their businesses with the Paris Agreement); Maitane Sardom,
Barclays Pledges Net Zero Emissions by 2050, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5CGC-FGEH (describing the pledges made by “Europe’s
largest money managers”); Alastair Marsh, HSBC Shareholders Ask Bank to
Cut Fossil-Fuel Lending Exposure, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://perma.cc/SYCA-T86X (PDF) (reporting on HSBC shareholders’
resolution urging the bank “to reduce its exposure to fossil-fuel assets and set
targets in line with the Paris Agreement”).
122. See UNILEVER, CLIMATE TRANSITION ACTION PLAN 2 (2021),
https://perma.cc/2AUG-SJRL (PDF) (“[Unilever’s] target covers upstream
Scope 3 emissions, Scope 1 & 2 emissions and mandatory downstream Scope 3
emissions.”); Ryan Beene, GE Sets 2050 Goal of Zero Emissions from Jet
Engines, Gas Power, BLOOMBERG GREEN (July 12, 2021, 9:00 AM),
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Private environmental governance may be motivated by “a
mixture of efficiency, resource supply, competition, and
reputational goals that can all be squared neatly with profit
maximization, along with altruistic preferences or norms.”123
Net zero commitments specifically can yield more
energy-efficient operations, boost employee morale, burnish a
company’s reputation, and respond to pressure from customers,
investors, and lenders.124 These commitments can also express
corporate values and improve a company’s strategic position in
anticipation of future developments.125
Some steps toward net zero, including energy efficiency
measures and targeted investing, are win-win opportunities
that can simultaneously increase profits and decrease carbon
emissions.126 These opportunities are substantial: an estimated
40 percent of GHG emissions in key supply chains could be
eliminated through measures that would save money or come at
very low cost.127 With respect to efficiency measures, private
environmental governance can “provid[e] information about the
efficiency opportunity, overcom[e] behavioral failures, better
https://perma.cc/4QDW-YQP6 (explaining GE’s dedication to address Scope 3
emissions); Emily Pontecorvo, How to Make a Net-Zero Pledge that Actually
Means Something, GRIST (Sept. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/PE4B-WYNL
(“Scope 3 emissions make up the vast majority of most companies’ carbon
footprints, so it’s essential that they are included in net-zero targets.”).
123. Vandenbergh, Private, supra note 118, at 180.
124. See MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND
POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 138–49
(2017) (explaining how climate issues become a priority to individuals and
corporations as well as the benefits of making climate concerns a priority).
125. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 20 (explaining
that some corporations value “sustainability in their corporate identity and as
a selling point to consumers”).
126. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Motivating Private Climate Governance:
The Role of the Efficiency Gap, 71 ARK. L. REV. 349, 353–54 (2018) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh, Motivating] (“If many situations exist in which corporations and
households can profit by reducing energy use, private initiatives that target
corporations and households should not need the coercive power or resources
of government to induce them to act . . . .”); GROUP OF 30, MAINSTREAMING THE
TRANSITION TO A NET-ZERO ECONOMY 38 (2021), https://perma.cc/9RUN-QDTC
(PDF) (“There is already evidence that by investing in ‘greener’ companies,
investors can reap significant financial rewards.”).
127. See WEF, supra note 66, at 17 (stating that about “40% of all
emissions could be eliminated with measures that either yield savings . . . or
come at abatement costs below €10 per tonne of CO2e”).
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align[] incentives between principals and agents, or otherwise
overcom[e] barriers to actions that are in the target’s
interest.”128 Relatedly, investing in companies that are
implementing net zero strategies can benefit investors’ bottom
line by focusing on companies best positioned for the long
term.129
Achieving net zero will not always involve win-win
situations.130 When additional costs are involved, a company
that adopts a net zero target presumably will have motivations
other than direct cost savings.131 Perhaps the reputational
benefits from a net zero target will outweigh any sales lost due
to higher costs.132 Overall sales might increase if consumers are
willing to pay more for low-carbon goods.133 Although evidence
on consumer willingness to pay a premium for more sustainably
produced goods and services is mixed,134 a company may derive
reputational benefits among corporate customers, lenders,
investors, and employees even if sales do not increase.135

128. Vandenbergh, Motivating, supra note 126, at 354.
129. See GROUP OF 30, supra note 126, at 40 (“A company that significantly
lags behind its peers in reducing its emissions is more likely to lose market
share as carbon prices increase than a company that is just as high carbon as
its competitors.”).
130. See Desmond Butler & Steven Mufson, Can the Market Save the
Planet? FedEx Is the Latest Brand-Name Firm to Say It’s Trying, WASH. POST
(Mar. 5, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/RK3Y-LTE7 (quoting U.C.S.D.
professor David Victor) (“Net zero does not mean efficiency; it means complete
transformation, and that’s the challenge.”).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See WEF, supra note 66, at 21 (“[S]urvey-based studies indicate that
more than 50% of consumers are willing to pay more for sustainable
products.”); VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 142 (noting studies
finding willingness to pay a small premium in some cases but concluding that
“overall consumer demand for low-carbon goods . . . is not overwhelming”).
Price increases for end-consumers sometimes can be kept to a minimum. WEF,
supra note 66, at 21 (estimating a 1–4 percent rise in consumer prices in the
medium term as a result of accounting for supply chain emissions).
134. See Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private
Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 1, 69 n.304 (2015)
(“Most studies thus far have focused on consumer demand as the primary
motivating factor, but studies point to conflicting results.”).
135. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 142–43 (discussing
corporate investments in building and maintaining reputation and evidence
that corporate actions on climate change affect reputation).
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Admittedly, such benefits can be difficult to measure, and they
may depend more on the perception that a company is reducing
emissions than its actual conduct.136
Some companies may set a net zero target in anticipation of
future regulation or future markets. Shortly after President
Biden’s inauguration, GM announced that it would sell only
electric vehicles by 2035 and achieve carbon neutrality by
2040.137 The move was apparently made in response to political
developments and a growing belief that electric cars will soon
dominate the market for new automobiles.138 Similarly, Shell’s
pledge to achieve net zero by 2050, inclusive of emissions
associated with its products, reflects the company’s assessment
that focusing on “markets where demand for cleaner products
and services is strongest” will “deliver[] more predictable cash
flows and generat[e] higher returns.”139 Furthermore, net zero
commitments by thirty-five U.S. utilities appear to reflect
growing confidence in hydrogen as a fuel source and other
potential technological advances.140 Whether companies will
take concrete actions to back up such pronouncements depends
not only on their good faith but also on their willingness to make
decisions based on long-term projections.
Companies often frame net zero targets in terms of doing
the right thing. For example, BP’s chairman declared, “[a]iming
for net zero is not only the right thing for BP, it is the right thing

136. See id. at 142 (“The most important corporate motivations may arise
less from corporate concerns about direct consumer purchasing
behavior . . . than from more indirect brand reputation concerns.”).
137. See Neal E. Boudette & Coral Davenport, G.M. Will Sell Only
Zero-Emission Vehicles by 2035, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2021),
https://perma.cc/F2A9-FYMK (last updated Oct. 1, 2021) (“Leaders could point
to G.M.’s decision as evidence that even big businesses have decided it is
time . . . to transition away from fossil fuels that have powered the global
economy for more than a century.”).
138. See id. (stating that electric cars are the “fastest-growing segment of
the auto industry”).
139. Press Release, Shell, Shell Accelerates Drive for Net-Zero Emissions
with Customer-First Strategy (Feb. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/HC57-5G5M.
140. See John Fialka, How 35 Utilities Plan to Hit Net Zero, E&E NEWS
(Feb. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/Q4DX-7P6H (“The leading innovation
appears to be ‘green’ hydrogen, an energy carrier that can be produced with
little or no CO2 emissions.”).
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for our shareholders and for society more broadly.”141 Nestlé’s
CEO similarly wrote: “[a]s a good steward of the planet, Nestlé
feels a moral obligation to make these changes and believes that
the work we are doing is critical to the survival of supply chains
and our business.”142 And Walmart’s President and CEO
announced, “[w]e want to go beyond sustainability to become a
regenerative company dedicated to placing nature and
humanity at the center of our business practices.”143 Such
pronouncements warrant healthy skepticism. They nonetheless
offer a reminder that factors other than profit may motivate
corporate decision making.144
Notwithstanding a range of possible motivations, net zero
targets undeniably pose a danger of greenwashing. In general,
voluntary environmental programs in the United States have
yielded limited environmental improvements.145 The popularity
of net zero targets and the lack of detail behind many of them
suggest a serious risk of greenwashing.146 Excluding Scope 3
emissions from net zero targets can allow companies to claim
carbon neutrality while maintaining carbon-intensive business
models.147 The fact that many net zero targets are decades away
raises further doubts: in the year 2050, will anyone notice or
141. Press Release, bp, BP Sets Ambition for Net Zero by 2050,
Fundamentally Changing Organisation to Deliver (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://perma.cc/T8KC-DGSJ.
142. Mark Schneider, Nestle CEO: Climate Change Laggards Put the
Planet—and Their Businesses—at Risk, FORTUNE (Dec. 2, 2020, 1:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/C726-HXPJ.
143. Doug McMillon, Walmart’s Regenerative Approach: Going Beyond
Sustainability, WALMART (Sept. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/KAG8-AA25.
144. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 151–52 (suggesting
that corporate decision makers have flexibility to pursue goals in addition to
pure profit).
145. See Cary Coglianese, Pledging, Populism, and the Paris Agreement:
The Paradox of a Management-Based Approach to Global Governance, 34 MD.
J. INT’L L. 139, 167–68 (2019) (stating that many facilities joined Performance
Track, a voluntary environmental program, to be seen as leaders rather than
to actually improve environmental performance).
146. See Edward Klump, Natural Gas and Net Zero: Can They Coexist?,
ENERGYWIRE (Oct. 13, 2021, 6:13 AM), https://perma.cc/4THU-EF2L (saying
that “green washing” is a term used by climate advocates to suggest corporate
actions are insufficient).
147. See, e.g., id. (noting utility company’s pledge to achieve net zero by
2035, excluding Scope 3 emissions, but that such emissions currently account
for 83 percent of the company’s current GHG emissions).
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sanction an entity’s failure to achieve a target set in 2022? Net
zero targets might represent no more than empty promises that
help companies deflect criticism and forestall regulation.148
Although the relatively weak threat of GHG regulation to date
suggests that regulatory avoidance has not been a primary
motivation behind corporate net zero targets,149 political
momentum for such regulation has been building.
Greenwashing aside, net zero targets may fail to live up to
their promises for another reason. Namely, the GHG-emitting
activities once performed by net zero companies may simply
continue under other companies that are not bound by net zero
pledges.150 Such “net zero leakage” could severely undermine the
impact of implementing net zero pledges.151 A prominent
example of net zero leakage involves the sell-off by major oil
companies of their most heavily polluting assets to small,
privately held companies.152 Such moves reduce the carbon
emissions associated with the large companies but yield little, if
any, environmental benefit.153 In some instances, emissions may
even increase because the purchasers—often private companies
not subject to investor pressure—are more likely to develop the
asset and to operate with lower standards.154
148. See Joshua Ulan Galperin, Environmental Governance at the Edge of
Democracy, 39 VA. ENV’T L.J. 70, 94–97 (2021) (discussing potential for private
environmental governance to displace government programs).
149. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 150 (noting that
many corporations reaffirmed their intent to reduce GHG emissions
notwithstanding the Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the
Paris Agreement).
150. See John Mulliken, Big Oil Gets Clean and the World Stays Dirty,
BOSTON GLOBE, https://perma.cc/PX7G-BBT8 (last updated June 10, 2021, 3:00
AM) (“BP sold its oil reserves on Alaska’s North Slope to Hilcorp, a private
company.”).
151. See id.
152. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Here Are America’s Top Methane Emitters. Some
Will Surprise You., N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/N37Z-7Z2E
(last updated Oct. 26, 2021); Mulliken, supra note 150 (“But the path of least
resistance for them likely will be to sell off the dirtiest parts of their portfolios
to private companies whose investors and boards do not face the same
scrutiny.”).
153. See Tabuchi, supra note 152 (stating that smaller companies have no
public scrutiny or pressure to improve their environmental targets, and that
operating in a green manner is not a priority for their business models).
154. See Carlos Anchondo & Mike Lee, Oil Majors Are Getting Out of Oil.
It Might Spike Emissions, ENERGYWIRE (June 17, 2021, 7:16 AM),

MAKING NET ZERO MATTER
B.

709

Motivations for Governmental Pledges

Governments do not face the same profit-driven incentives
to adopt net zero targets as the private sector. Nonetheless,
some climate-related policy changes, such as the elimination of
fossil fuel subsidies or the imposition of carbon taxes, would
benefit public budgets.155 Moreover, the adoption of net zero
targets by many governments points to policy or political
benefits. Governments’ net zero targets can align national
climate policy with international climate objectives, guide
policymaking and decision making, provide certainty to
businesses, investors, and other actors, and shape sustainable
long-term development.156 Credible net zero commitments can
reduce the amount of stranded assets and reduce the need for
drastic policy interventions down the road.157 Macroeconomic
benefits may include higher levels of investment and reduced
fossil fuel imports.158
Economic nationalism may also motivate national net zero
pledges, as countries seek to promote clean technology
industries and employment, foster energy security, and lay the
groundwork for carbon border taxes.159 Net zero policies can help
https://perma.cc/5VKC-BMMW (“But while the sales would help Shell and
other oil companies move closer to meeting their own climate
goals . . . historically, asset sales have meant an uptick in emissions.”).
155. See Savannah Bertrand, Fact Sheet: Proposals to Reduce Fossil Fuel
Subsidies,
ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST.
(July
23,
2021),
https://perma.cc/G9K3-NBKM (“Eliminating fossil fuel subsidies would save
taxpayer dollars while simultaneously reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”).
156. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 5, 21
(describing broad motivations behind the adoption of net zero targets).
157. See GROUP OF 30, supra note 126, at 16 (“If ambitious climate targets
are seen as credible, businesses will stop investing in high-carbon technologies
and in the future, there will be fewer fully depreciated carbon-intensive plants
competing against green alternatives.”).
158. See id. at 10 (“In many cases, the macroeconomic benefits of higher
investments and lower fossil fuel imports may outweigh the macroeconomic
costs . . . .”).
159. See Daniel A. Farber et al., Thinking Globally, Acting Locally:
Lessons from the U.S., Japan, and China 38 (2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://perma.cc/LK9V-QUTM (PDF) (“States may also seek economic
advantage from being first-movers on climate change by developing related
intellectual property and industries.”); Nathanial Gronewold, More Nations
Aim for Net-Zero Emissions by 2050, CLIMATEWIRE (Nov. 30, 2020, 7:01 AM),
https://perma.cc/K48M-G3BS (illustrating the trend of setting net zero target
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first-movers to develop expertise and new technologies that can
provide a long-term competitive advantage.160 Nations that
develop more sustainable, post-industrial economies will often
be attractive to businesses and individuals.161 Indeed,
politicians in some countries have campaigned in response to
popular support for ambitious climate action.162 In other
countries, however, populist movements have pushed in the
opposite direction, prompting leaders to attack commitments on
climate change and other global matters.163
International political pressure is another important factor
that can encourage states to make and carry out net zero
pledges. The Paris Agreement does not require parties to submit
NDCs that would be consistent with the 1.5°C or 2°C
temperature goals, nor does it require parties to achieve the
commitments set forth in their NDCs.164 Rather, the agreement
assumes that international pressure will lead countries to

by 2050, fueled by “economic nationalism, trade frictions[,] and a rise of
populism”).
160. See GROUP OF 30, supra note 126, at 10 (“[C]ountries that move ahead
of others are well-positioned to benefit from the economic opportunities that
the transition to net zero brings.”).
161. See Farber et al., supra note 159, at 43 (“[J]urisdictions . . . may want
to gain or burnish their reputations for being forward-looking and sustainable,
which can help attract business and residents for a post-industrial economy.”).
162. See GROUP OF 30, supra note 126, at xiii–xiv (“An increasing number
of politicians have recognized this and campaign on ambitious targets to
reduce emissions.”). For example, Liberal candidates in Canada promised to
commit Canada to achieving net zero emissions by 2050. See Liberals Move
Forward to Legislate Net-Zero Emissions by 2050, LIBERAL (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/7R7V-CSHC (“[A] re-elected Liberal government will take
concrete steps to lower emissions and make life more affordable for
Canadians.”). And during the 2020 presidential campaign, Joe Biden endorsed
the goal of achieving net zero emissions in the energy sector by 2035. See Adam
Aton, Can the “Biden Green Deal” Appease Progressives?, CLIMATEWIRE (Oct.
1, 2020, 5:40 AM), https://perma.cc/V2C4-S7M2.
163. See Coglianese, supra note 145, at 176–78 (“The Paris Agreement’s
flexibility and voluntary nature have so far not kept populist elected leaders
in countries such as the United States and Brazil from lambasting it.”).
164. See Noah M. Sachs, The Paris Agreement in the 2020s: Breakdown or
Breakup?, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 872 (2019) (“The parties opted for this
voluntary approach because a ‘tougher’ agreement with binding targets and
enforceable sanctions would not have attracted the participation of major
emitters, including the United States.”).
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ratchet up their NDCs over time.165 National net zero targets
function in a similar voluntary and self-determined way as
NDCs. Indeed, NDCs could eventually incorporate net zero
targets. Unfortunately, with respect to both NDCs and net zero
targets, policymakers face incentives to set ambitious
goals—while simultaneously instituting weak policies unlikely
to accomplish those goals.166 Ultimately, it is not clear that
international pressure will be sufficient to compel countries to
achieve their NDCs or their net zero pledges. Powerful domestic
interests will offer stiff resistance, especially as increasingly
stringent emissions reductions become necessary to achieve net
zero.167 Furthermore, “naming and shaming” strategies offer
little leverage against voluntary pledges, particularly where
widely accepted benchmarks for evaluating those pledges do not
exist.168
III. REINFORCING NET ZERO TARGETS
Nation-states and corporations have various motivations to
make net zero pledges, and perhaps weaker motivations to
implement and achieve those pledges. To increase the likelihood
of follow-through on net zero commitments, society should
develop and implement transparency and accountability
mechanisms. In addition, both public law and private law offer
tools for potentially enforcing net zero pledges notwithstanding
their voluntary nature.
165. See id. at 874–76 (“The ratchet mechanism refers to the provisions of
the Paris Agreement that require parties to submit progressively more
‘ambitious’ NDCs over time.”).
166. See id. at 875 (“[T]he ratchet mechanism is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a consistent, upward trajectory of NDCs. Parties must
somehow be incentivized to stick with it.”); GROUP OF 30, supra note 126, at xiv
(“Once elected, politicians are hence tempted to skimp on environmental
efforts to fuel short-term growth.”).
167. See Sachs, supra note 164, at 876–77 (“In each party’s cost-benefit
calculus, powerful domestic economic interests will undoubtedly weigh as
much or more than concerns about international reputation . . . .”).
168. See Coglianese, supra note 145, at 164–65 (noting that the Paris
Agreement “offers no clear, commonly accepted norm with respect to the
amount of emissions reductions that any nation should achieve”); Sachs, supra
note 164, at 876–83 (challenging assumption that peer pressure will
consistently support ratcheting up of national pledges under Paris
Agreement).
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A.

Transparency and Verification of Net Zero Targets

Transparency plays an important role in translating
voluntary commitments into meaningful impacts. Public
commitments can attract attention, provide clear direction to
stakeholders, and promote accountability.169 Transparency on
specific details—including an entity’s planned pathway to net
zero, emissions reduction measures, actual emissions, and
reliance on offsets and carbon removals—will enable
distinctions to be drawn between genuine progress toward net
zero and mere greenwashing.170
With
sufficient
transparency,
nongovernmental
organizations, rival companies, the media, investors, and the
public can track entities’ progress in achieving net zero and
highlight their shortcomings.171 For private climate initiatives,
market incentives, peer pressure, and reputational risk all can
promote accountability.172 Reporting and review mechanisms
common in environmental treaty regimes can serve a similar
function for governmental net zero targets.173
1.

Disclosure Frameworks

In the absence of specific legal mandates, voluntary
frameworks and standards for sustainability reporting offer
potentially useful guidance on the development and disclosure

169. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 19
(“Clearly communicating a net-zero target to domestic and international
stakeholders is essential if a genuine commitment to transform economic
systems is not to be perceived as political greenwashing.”).
170. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 5, 57–58 (“Such
transparency also provides a clearer opportunity for ambitious actors to stand
out.”).
171. See Light & Orts, supra note 134, at 58 (explaining different methods
of enforcement with examples from both public and private sectors).
172. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 386 (“[P]rivate
climate initiatives often do provide some level of accountability by firms to
customers, investors, and employees who have preferences for reducing carbon
emissions.”).
173. See DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238–43 (2010) (explaining the different types of
reporting mechanisms in environmental treaty regimes, and their pros and
cons).
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of net zero targets.174 A leading voluntary framework, from the
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD),
includes general recommendations for climate-related
disclosures.175 Of particular relevance to net zero targets are
recommendations to “[d]isclose Scope 1, Scope 2, and, if
appropriate, Scope 3 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions” and to
“[d]escribe the targets used by the organization to manage
climate-related risks and opportunities and performance
against targets.”176 Although the TCFD framework does not
expressly mention net zero targets, corporate disclosure of such
targets should follow the TCFD’s advice to describe timeframes
for applying climate-related targets and indicators for assessing
progress against targets.177 Further reporting guidance can be
found in standards issued by the Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (SASB) and the Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI). The SASB standards concern the reporting of financially
material sustainability information—i.e., information that
would be useful to investors.178 The widely used GRI standards

174. See Richard Barker et al., The Future of ESG Is . . . Accounting?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/G2DU-BTEA (discussing
proposed creation of Sustainability Standards Board that would create a
global baseline of sustainability disclosure standards); IFRS Foundation
Announces International Sustainability Standards Board, Consolidation with
CDSB and VRF, and Publication of Prototype Disclosure Requirements, IFRS
FOUND. (Nov. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/6FWR-7AWZ (announcing formation
of International Sustainability Standards Board).
175. See MADISON CONDON ET AL., MANDATING DISCLOSURE OF
CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL RISK 18 (2021), https://perma.cc/93DX-VE9Z
(PDF) (discussing “broad support [for the framework] from the investment
community, regulators, and corporations”).
176. TASK
FORCE
ON
CLIMATE-RELATED
FIN.
DISCLOSURES,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURES 14, 22–23 (2017), https://perma.cc/M9B5-UGX2 (PDF).
177. See id. at 23 (giving guidelines for metrics and targets sectors should
adopt).
178. See CONDON ET AL., supra note 175, at 19 (stating that the SASB
standards “supplement[] the TCFD framework by providing detail and
specificity”); Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties
and ESG Integration, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 772 (2019) (“The SASB explains
that the standards represent ‘a complete set of globally applicable
industry-specific standards which identify the minimal set of financially
material sustainability topics and their associated metrics for the typical
company in an industry.’”).
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broadly address reporting on economic, environmental, and
social impacts, not all of which are relevant to investors.179
Voluntary standards specific to net zero targets are being
developed. In October 2021, the Science Based Targets Initiative
(SBTI) released its “Net-Zero Standard,” a document that offers
guidance, criteria, and recommendations for large corporations
in setting net zero targets.180 This voluntary standard defines
corporate net zero to mean “[r]educing scope 1, 2, and 3
emissions to zero or to a residual level that is consistent with
reaching net-zero emissions . . . in eligible 1.5°C-aligned
pathways” and “[n]eutralizing any residual emissions at the
net-zero target year” and beyond.181 Under this standard,
corporate net zero targets should include 5–10 year emissions
reduction targets in line with 1.5°C pathways, targets to reduce
emissions to a residual level in line with 1.5°C scenarios by
2050, and actions beyond companies’ value chains to mitigate
emissions or remove carbon.182
Government oversight of climate-related corporate
disclosures, which to date has been limited, is poised to
increase.183 Securities law requires publicly held companies to
179. See Gary, supra note 178, at 773–74 (“GRI released the Standards in
2016 to ‘enable all organizations to report publicly on their economic,
environmental and social impacts . . .’”); Barker et al., supra note 174 (“[T]he
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is focused on the entire range of
sustainability issues that matter to society as a whole.”).
180. See SCI. BASED TARGETS INITIATIVE, SBTI CORPORATE NET ZERO
STANDARD VERSION 4 (2021), https://perma.cc/PH2E-PUAR (PDF) (“Through a
transparent multi-stakeholder process, the Science Based Targets initiative
(SBTi) has developed the first global science-based standard for companies to
set net-zero targets.”). SBTI has issued separate guidance for financial
institutions and suggested that small- and medium-sized enterprises follow a
simplified route for setting net zero targets. See id. at 5 (stating that the “Net
Zero Standard” is meant for corporations with more than 500 employees, and
that there are separate guidelines for smaller businesses and financial
institutions).
181. Id. at 8.
182. See id. at 8–10 (describing targets for large corporations).
183. See Virginia Harper Ho, Modernizing ESG Disclosure, 2022 U. ILL. L.
REV. 277, 286–88 (“Demand for ESG disclosure reform has risen rapidly over
the past decade, driven by growing consensus among mainstream investors
that all companies should disclose material ESG information . . . .”); CONDON
ET AL., supra note 175, at 10, 21–22 (observing that climate-related disclosures
have “failed to result in comparable, specific, and decision-useful climate risk
disclosure,” often because of their incompleteness and boilerplate nature).
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disclose material information.184 The materiality standard
refers to “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider [the information] important in deciding how to
vote.”185 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) guidance
on climate-related disclosures, issued in 2010, observes that
climate change may trigger required disclosures in terms of
impacts of climate change legislation and regulation, indirect
consequences of regulation or business trends, and climate
change’s physical impacts.186 The guidance focuses on disclosure
of impacts and risks, rather than forward-looking objectives
such as net zero targets.187 Nonetheless, as the SEC proceeds
with rulemaking on climate-related disclosures, the agency has
proposed to require companies to report and disclose specific
metrics such as GHG emissions and reduction goals.188
Legislative proposals to mandate climate-related disclosure
include both federal and state bills. At the federal level, the
Paris Climate Agreement Disclosure Act would amend the 1934
184. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)
(“What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood
that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.”).
185. Id.; see CONDON ET AL., supra note 175, at 12–13 (“The materiality
standard is a self-imposed limitation on the typical scope of the SEC’s
disclosure requirements, and the Commission has occasionally required
disclosures untethered from a materiality assessment.”).
186. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate
Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
211, 231 and 241) (“The Securities and Exchange Commission . . . is
publishing this interpretive release to provide guidance to public companies
regarding the Commission’s existing disclosure requirements as they apply to
climate change matters.”).
187. See id. at 6297 (“This interpretive release is intended to remind
companies of their obligations under existing federal securities laws and
regulations to consider climate change and its consequences as they prepare
disclosure documents to be filed with us and provided to investors.”).
188. See The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related
Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed. Reg. 21,334 (Apr. 11, 2022); SEC,
ENHANCEMENT AND STANDARDIZATION OF CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURES
(2022), https://perma.cc/JP6P-4FDF (PDF) (summarizing proposed rule).
Regulators in the United Kingdom, the European Union, Mexico, and New
Zealand are considering requirements that companies make TCFD-compliant
disclosures. See GROUP OF 30, supra note 126, at 29 (“To support the progress
being made on the voluntary and private sector side, authorities around the
world need to set out a timetable for making TCFD-compliant disclosure
mandatory.”).
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Securities Exchange Act to require public companies to report
on whether they have “set or . . . committed to achieve, targets
that are a balance between greenhouse gas emissions and
removals, at a pace consistent with [Paris’s temperature
goals].”189 Companies that have not set or committed to set such
targets would be required to explain their failure to do so. The
Climate Risk Disclosure Act would require public companies to
report GHG emissions and potential financial impacts of climate
change.190 And at the state level, California’s proposed Climate
Corporate Accountability Act initially sought to require large
companies doing business in the state to set science-based
emission targets consistent with Paris’s 1.5°C temperature goal,
although this requirement has since been deleted from the
bill.191
2.

Benchmarking and Third-Party Certification

Disclosure requirements would not make emissions targets
or net zero targets enforceable. However, disclosure
requirements could foster standardization of reporting and
target-setting, thereby making it easier for stakeholders and the
public to draw comparisons between companies, evaluate the
ambition of targets, and hold companies accountable for their
progress (or lack thereof) in achieving them.
An important way in which disclosure can promote
accountability is by enabling benchmarking of net zero
strategies and the establishment of scorecards that analyze
company performance in an accessible format.192 For example,
the Climate Action 100+ Net Zero Company Benchmark
assesses major carbon-emitting companies with respect to their

189. Paris Climate Agreement Disclosure Act (Discussion Draft), 117th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(1)(A) (2021), https://perma.cc/FX9M-VGRY (PDF).
190. See H.R. 2570, 117th Cong. (2021) (setting out disclosure
requirements of GHG emissions for public companies).
191. See S.B. 260, Cal. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021), https://perma.cc/5ARVMXD3 (explaining that the act would require businesses to make certain
disclosures regarding their GHG emissions).
192. See Louis G. Leonard, Under the Radar: A Coherent System of Climate
Governance, Driven by Business, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10546, 10561 (2020) (“Just
as setting a target seems to unlock innovative capacity to implement it, setting
a target also should trigger corporate self-governance processes to drive
compliance.”).

MAKING NET ZERO MATTER

717

net zero ambition, emissions reductions targets and goals,
decarbonization strategy, capital allocation alignment, and
other indicators.193 In regard to short-term emissions targets, a
company is assessed on whether it has set a target between 2020
and 2025 for reducing emissions, whether any such target covers
at least 95 percent of Scope 1 and 2 emissions, whether the
company has set a Scope 3 emissions target, and whether the
company’s short-term target is aligned with a trajectory to
achieve Paris’s 1.5°C goal.194 The assessment’s purpose is to set
corporate expectations and inform corporate actions, establish a
mechanism for tracking progress, and provide a tool for
investors to evaluate and engage with companies.195
Third-party certification of net zero efforts can reinforce
carbon disclosure.196 Various entities offer carbon neutrality

193. See CLIMATE ACTION 100+, 2020 PROGRESS REPORT 11 (2020)
[hereinafter 2020 PROGRESS REPORT], https://perma.cc/ZUS7-ED5M (PDF)
(explaining updates on how Climate Action 100+ evaluates companies).
Assessments of individual companies can be found at Companies, CLIMATE
ACTION 100+, https://perma.cc/8RH2-SJTH. The Benchmark “does not
interrogate the quality of company decarbonisation strategies directly.”
Frequently Asked Questions, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://perma.cc/D3MPHA96.
194. See 2020 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 193, at 17 (describing
disclosure indicators for companies).
195. See id. at 14–15 (“Climate Action 100+ seeks to focus investor action
on the world’s largest GHG emitters, including emissions across the value
chain, and companies that present the greatest climate-related risk to
investors’ portfolios or that have a significant opportunity to drive a broader
net-zero economy transition.”). For specified sectors, the Benchmark also
considers companies’ capital expenditures and output relative to a range of
climate change scenarios. For example, with respect to capital allocation by
electric utilities, the Benchmark assesses a company’s projected technology
mix compared to the market average and whether a company has announced
a full phase-out of coal or gas units by 2040. See id. at 21 (“The capital
allocation indicators are designed to complement the disclosure indicators by
providing further insights to investors regarding the adequacy of companies’
capital allocation plans, and relative alignment with the company’s stated
emissions reduction targets.”).
196. See Graeme Auld & Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Private Regulation in
Global Environmental Governance, in THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL CLIMATE &
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 394, 405 (Robert Falkner ed., 2013),
https://perma.cc/S59T-WFRN (PDF) (noting that Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP) discloses corporate responses and summary analyses of companies’
climate-related activities but does not set standards for corporate
performance).
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certifications for specific products, activities, or companies.197
Such certifications may serve as initial steps toward
implementing net zero targets but do not necessarily warrant
that a company is achieving net zero from society’s overall
perspective. This is because carbon neutrality certifications
generally do not account for Scope 3 emissions, and companies
may offset their emissions through carbon credits that may not
represent the permanent removal of carbon from the
atmosphere.198
By encouraging green innovation and improvements in
production processes, environmental certification programs can
complement traditional regulation and promote public ends.199
The oversight potentially provided by certification systems can
be especially valuable in the absence of government
regulation.200 However, certification systems themselves may be
subject to concerns about credibility, transparency, and cost,
and consumers may not be able to readily judge the meaning of
a particular certification or distinguish between different
certifications.201 Ideally, third-party certification of net zero

197. See, e.g., NAT. CAP. PARTNERS, THE CARBONNEUTRAL PROTOCOL: THE
GLOBAL STANDARD FOR CARBON NEUTRAL PROGRAMMES 26 (2021),
https://perma.cc/4T4W-BAJG (PDF) (“To provide consistency across a wide
range of possible situations, The Protocol provides for a number of different
CarbonNeutral certifications corresponding to different possible entities,
products and activities.”); Claire Elise Thompson, “Climate Neutral” Products
Are Now a Thing. What’s Behind the Label?, GRIST (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://perma.cc/5HCP-SH5Y (describing Climate Neutral Certified, a
nonprofit attempting to hold businesses to higher standards to maintain good
practices for the environment).
198. See Briefing: Net Zero for Corporates, CARBON TRUST,
https://perma.cc/2JPV-TW8N (stating that companies should report progress
against targets annually and include “fully disaggregated emissions and
removals in the GHG Inventory, broken down by Scope 1, 2, and 3); see, e.g.,
Climate Neutral Certified Brands, CLIMATE NEUTRAL, https://perma.cc/7CVCKKNK (listing 338 brands that have become Climate Neutral Certified); NAT.
CAP. PARTNERS, supra note 197, at 28–29, 63.
199. See Albert C. Lin, Power to the People: Restoring the Public Voice in
Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1017, 1035 (2013) (explaining the
promise of environmental certification).
200. See id. at 1022 (“Finally, the government’s struggles to address
environmental challenges suggest general limitations to the ability of
conventional regulation alone to adequately respond to these challenges.”).
201. See id. at 1036–37 (discussing credibility, transparency, and
accountability concerns because consumers must rely on certifiers to
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efforts would offer transparency on certification standards and
procedures, include audits of the companies they certify, and
clearly communicate the meaning of certification.202
***
The net zero transparency and accountability efforts
discussed above focus primarily on the private sector, but
disclosure and verification requirements could apply similarly
to government net zero targets. Government pledges are already
being tracked on several websites, including Climate Watch’s
Net Zero Tracker203 and the United Nations’ Climate Action
website.204 Such websites should include coverage of specific
commitments and plans underlying net zero pledges as nations
flesh them out. Furthermore, integrating net zero pledges or
elements of those pledges into NDCs would trigger an array of
accountability mechanisms found in the Paris Agreement.
These mechanisms include incorporation of NDCs in a public
registry, reports of progress in implementing NDCs, technical
expert review, and multilateral peer review.205
B.

Enforcement of Private Net Zero Targets

Ensuring that entities implement net zero targets is
challenging. While voluntary commitments by definition are not
legally enforceable, various mechanisms are available to
pressure companies to follow through on their net zero pledges.
In the United States, such mechanisms include securities fraud

determine whether a product was produced in an environmentally friendly
manner).
202. See id. at 1037 (stating that parties with access to information on
third-party certifiers’ finances, evaluation criteria, and monitoring processes
can assess the credibility of certification schemes).
203. Net Zero Tracker, supra note 1.
204. Net-Zero Coalition, U.N.: CLIMATE ACTION, https://perma.cc/2JUHGDAW.
205. See Paris Agreement arts. 4, 13, supra note 18 (outlining
accountability mechanisms); see also U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT,
REFERENCE MANUAL FOR THE ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK UNDER
THE PARIS AGREEMENT (2020), https://perma.cc/2WX5-9EBB (PDF) (offering
guidance to technical expert reviewers in fulfilling their tasks under the Paris
Agreement).
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litigation,
consumer
protection
actions,
contractual
arrangements, and consumer and investor pressure.206
1.

Securities Fraud Litigation

Plaintiffs are just beginning to test the potential for
securities fraud claims to police climate disclosures. Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934207 makes it
unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device . . . .”208 Rule 10b-5 specifies that such unlawful conduct
includes the making of an untrue statement of a material fact or
the omission of a material fact.209 “In a typical § 10(b) private
action a plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between
the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”210
While the case law on Section 10(b) actions involving
sustainability disclosures is limited, courts have tended to look
more favorably on claims involving “concrete, repetitive, and
fact based” disclosures, as opposed to disclosures that “contain
‘vague’ and ‘aspirational’ language.”211 This distinction suggests
that distant net zero targets may prove less actionable than
more immediate and concrete goals. While courts may hesitate
to enforce even the latter because of their forward-looking

206. Other mechanisms may be available outside the United States. For
example, the Dutch trial court decision in Vereniging Milieudefensie v. Royal
Dutch Shell relied on an “unwritten standard of care” in the Dutch Civil Code
to require Shell Oil to reduce its CO2 emissions by at least 45 percent by 2030.
Rechtbank Den Haag [Court of the Hague] 26 mei 2021,
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2021:5339, 4.4.1, 5.3 (Vereniging Milieudefensie/Royal
Dutch Shell).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 78.
208. Id. § 78j(b).
209. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
210. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 157 (2008).
211. Caitlin M. Ajax & Diane Strauss, Corporate Sustainability
Disclosures in American Case Law: Purposeful or Mere “Puffery”?, 45 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 703, 706 (2018).
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nature,212 investors’ growing interest in, and use of,
climate-related information increases the likelihood that courts
will find such information material.213 Indeed, the fact that a
corporate statement is contingent or future-oriented does not
preclude a materiality finding.214 Predictive statements can
serve as a basis for liability if they were false at the time they
were made and were unaccompanied by meaningful cautionary
language.215
Lawsuits alleging that Exxon Mobil misled investors with
respect to climate change costs hint at how courts might address
Section 10(b) misrepresentation claims involving net zero
targets. The leading case was brought by New York under a
state law governing securities fraud.216 That law, which
incorporates the federal standard of materiality, prohibits a
misrepresentation of material facts in connection with the
issuance, purchase, or sale of securities.217 New York alleged

212. See id. at 707 (suggesting that “most sustainability disclosures and
public sustainability commitments from companies are . . . ‘aspirational’”).
213. See Hana V. Vizcarra, The Reasonable Investor and Climate-Related
Information: Changing Expectations for Financial Disclosures, 50 ENV’T L.
REP. 10106, 10107 (2020) [hereinafter Vizcarra, Reasonable Investor] (“The
shift in how reasonable investors view climate-related information means
companies can no longer make materiality determinations the way they
always have. As more reasonable investors consider such information
material, the likelihood increases that courts will.”).
214. In Ajax & Strauss, supra note 211, the authors noted the Supreme
Court’s holding in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988), “that
‘materiality’ in the context of contingent and/or speculative information will
depend on ‘a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity.’” Ajax & Strauss, supra note 211, at 717.
215. See In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 2d 712, 747–48 (S.D. Tex.
2012) (“Where the forward-looking statement is not accompanied by
cautionary language, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant made
the statement with ‘actual knowledge’ as to its falsity.”); Vizcarra, Reasonable
Investor, supra note 213, at 10108 (“There is also a statutory protection for
forward-looking statements when accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements or when not made with actual knowledge that the statement was
misleading.”).
216. See New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 2019 WL
6795771, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019) (explaining the Martin Act).
217. See id. at *3 (stating that the law “prohibits the use of ‘any device,
scheme
or
artifice . . . deception,
misrepresentation,
concealment,
suppression, fraud, false pretense or false promise’ in connection with the
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that Exxon Mobil misled investors by disclosing publicly a proxy
cost of carbon that reflected possible climate regulations while
relying internally on GHG projections that did not account for
such regulation.218 Finding Exxon Mobil’s disclosures not
misleading, the trial court reasoned that the proxy cost of carbon
metric and internal GHG projections served different purposes
and that no actual investors were misled.219 The court also found
any alleged disinformation immaterial because “no reasonable
investor would have viewed speculative assumptions about
hypothetical regulatory costs projected decades into the future
as significantly altering the total mix of information
available.”220 The court’s reasoning, if applied to net zero
targets, does not rule out Section 10(b) claims.221 However, it
does suggest that courts will carefully consider the nature of a
company’s assumptions and the timeframe of future projections.
2.

Federal and State Consumer Protection Laws

State consumer protection laws, as well as the Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC) authority over unfair or deceptive
practices, could also serve as leverage with respect to corporate
net zero targets.
Section 5 of the FTC Act222 authorizes the FTC to police
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce”;223 an act or practice is deceptive if it is likely to
‘issuance, exchange, purchase, sale, promotion, negotiation, advertisement,
investment advice or distribution’ of securities”).
218. Id. at *12–13. But cf. Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d
832, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (denying Exxon’s motion to dismiss claim that use
of proxy cost of carbon that differed from GHG costs could constitute material
misrepresentation under Section 10(b)).
219. Exxon Mobil, 2019 WL 6795771, at *15.
220. Id. at *21 (internal quotation omitted).
221. See Hana Vizcarra, Understanding the New York v. Exxon Decision,
HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Dec. 12, 2019),
https://perma.cc/EK7H-B7CT (“This case does not preclude climate-related
information from being material, whether disclosed through voluntary or
mandatory disclosures.”).
222. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
223. Id. § 45(a)(1). “Deception” is defined as “a representation, omission or
practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C.
110, 110 (1984).
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mislead, even if it does not cause actual deception.224 The
agency’s “Green Guides” provide guidance on environmental
claims that may qualify as unfair or deceptive.225 Enforcement
against green marketing claims has historically focused on
testable, product-specific claims, such as false claims that a
product is biodegradable or incorporates recycled content.226
Enforcement with respect to net zero pledges may be trickier,
given the distant timeframes at issue, the focus of such pledges
on a company’s overall emissions rather than emissions
associated with a specific product, and the various ways of
Nonetheless,
nongovernmental
defining
net
zero.227
organizations recently filed a complaint with the FTC against
Chevron with respect to its broad statements of environmental
commitments.228 The complaint alleges that Chevron overstated
in advertisements its investments in renewable energy and its
commitment to reducing fossil pollution and requests that
Chevron stop its deceptive marketing efforts and disseminate
corrective statements.229
224. See David Hackett et al., Growing ESG Risks: The Rise of Litigation,
50 ENV’T L. REP. 10849, 10853 (2020) (“Notably, in order for the FTC to find a
company’s conduct to be improperly deceptive, the company need not actually
deceive or even intend to deceive a consumer.”).
225. See FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16
C.F.R. § 260.1(a) (2012) (explaining the purpose of the guides).
226. See Robin N. Rotman et al., Greenwashing No More: The Case for
Stronger Regulation of Environmental Marketing, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 417, 422,
434 (2020) (discussing cases in which the FTC challenged claims such as “100%
biodegradable” and “compostable”); Timothy C. Bradley, Likelihood of
Eco-Friendly Confusion: Greenwashing and the FTC “Green Guides”,
LANDSLIDE
(Sept./Oct.
2011),
https://perma.cc/GUX7-3GFY
(PDF)
(summarizing efforts to curtail greenwashing).
227. See Kelly Levin et al., What Does “Net-Zero Emissions” Mean? 8
Common Questions, Answered, WORLD RES. INST. (Sept. 17, 2019) [hereinafter
Levin et al., What Does “Net-Zero Emissions Mean?], https://perma.cc/5EZZ4SNZ (discussing critiques of net zero targets).
228. See Kevin Crowley, Chevron ‘Greenwashing’ Targeted in Complaint
Filed With FTC, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8FULL2R5 (“Chevron’s pledge of ‘ever-cleaner energy’ amounts to so-called
greenwashing because it hides the reality that the company’s production plans
may end up increasing absolute emissions, according to Global Witness,
Greenpeace USA and Earthworks.”).
229. See Press Release, Earthworks, Accountability Groups File First of
Its Kind FTC Complaint Against Chevron for Misleading Consumers on
Climate Action (Mar. 16, 2021) (asserting that “[t]he complaint would be the
first to petition the FTC to use its Green Guides against a fossil fuel company
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State consumer protection laws may offer a similar
mechanism to enforce corporate net zero targets.230 State
consumer protection claims alleging misleading sustainability
information have typically centered on product labels, although
an increasing number of cases have focused on company
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) statements.231 In
adjudicating these claims, courts have distinguished company
commitments and statements of “specific and verifiable facts,”
which are more likely to be actionable, from merely
“aspirational” and forward-looking statements.232
Several states have filed lawsuits alleging that fossil fuel
companies’
deceptive
advertising,
marketing,
and
communications violated state consumer protection laws.233
These include: a complaint filed by Massachusetts alleging that
Exxon Mobil violated the state’s consumer protection law
through deceptive greenwashing campaigns and material
misrepresentations to investors about its use of a proxy cost of
carbon;234 a complaint filed by Connecticut alleging that Exxon
Mobil engaged in deceptive greenwashing in violation of the
state’s unfair trade practices act;235 a lawsuit filed by the
District of Columbia alleging that deceptive advertising,
for misleading consumers on the climate and environmental impact of its
operations”).
230. Unlike the FTC Act, state consumer protection acts allow private
parties to bring claims. See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State
Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 164,
173 (2011) (explaining differences between state and federal consumer
protection laws).
231. See Hackett et al., supra note 224, at 10851–52 (“While consumer
claims most commonly challenge product labeling, plaintiffs have begun to
extend the reach of these state consumer laws, setting their sights on company
ESG statements made in various forms.”).
232. See id. at 10852–53 (quoting Nat’l Consumers League v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL 4080541, at *6 (D.C. Super. Ct.
July 22, 2016)).
233. See Jennifer Hijazi, States Test New Climate Strategies in Big Oil
Showdowns, E&E NEWS (June 29, 2020, 6:51 AM), https://perma.cc/45EFSTF6 (“The top attorneys for the District of Columbia and Minnesota last week
launched major lawsuits against the oil and gas industry, adding to a growing
swell of climate battles focused on consumer protection.”).
234. Complaint at 197–98, 202–04, Massachusetts v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. 19-03333, 2019 WL 11666641 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2019).
235. Complaint at 36–43, Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
3:20-cv-1555, 2021 WL 2389739 (D. Conn. June 2, 2021).
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marketing, and communications by multiple oil companies
constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices;236 and a
complaint filed by Vermont alleging similar claims under
Vermont law.237
These lawsuits, if successful, could lay the foundation for
future allegations that a company’s net zero pledge constituted
unlawful greenwashing or deceptive marketing. Courts
nonetheless may hesitate to premise liability on net zero targets
because of their forward-looking and aspirational nature238 and
their company-wide scope.239 Even if courts find liability, it is
not clear that they would require companies to follow through
on their pledges. Remedies in consumer protection cases
typically involve actual or punitive damages, restitution, or
perhaps injunctive relief barring further misrepresentations or
requiring corrective statements.240
3.

Enforcement by Contract

Contractual arrangements, by creating enforceable rights
that do not otherwise exist, can be useful mechanisms for
promoting accountability. Some corporations and institutions
already require suppliers to meet specified sustainability
standards.241 Net zero targets also could be integrated into
supply chain contracts and enforced by manufacturers and
236. Complaint at 67–77, District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp. et al.,
No. 2020 CA 002892 B (D.C. Super. Ct. June 25, 2020).
237. Complaint at 64–67, Vermont v. Exxon Mobil Corp. et al. (Vt. Super.
Ct. Sept. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/XJ5V-2CXP (PDF).
238. See Ajax & Strauss, supra note 211, at 725 (discussing the holding in
Ruiz v. Darigold, Inc., No. C14-1283RSL, 2014 WL 5599989, at *4 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 3, 2014), that forward-looking, aspirational statements in a CSR report
did not constitute a misrepresentation that would likely deceive a reasonable
consumer).
239. See id. at 724 (noting that in applying state consumer protection laws,
courts have “narrowed the definition of ‘material’ information to that
concerning product defect or product safety”).
240. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense
Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2005)
(discussing remedies available to private litigants).
241. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 144 (“Corporations
that buy materials from others may create supply chain contracting
requirements for carbon emissions reductions for a variety of reasons,
including not only to reduce costs and enhance reputation but also to increase
control over and certainty about supplies of raw materials and other goods.”).
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retailers.242 Indeed, a wide variety of contractual
mechanisms—including
loan
agreements,
development
agreements, and settlements—could be crafted to encourage net
zero implementation.243
The use of contractual financing arrangements to advance
environmental goals is not unprecedented. For example,
sustainability-linked bonds peg the interest rate a company
pays investors on whether the company achieves specified
environmental and other goals.244 Similarly, an agreement
between asset manager BlackRock and a group of banks links
BlackRock’s borrowing costs to its ability to achieve specified
environmental, social, and governance goals.245 Under such
arrangements, regular reporting of a company’s performance
with respect to those goals and third-party verification of
performance are essential.246 Financing arrangements have yet
to incorporate net zero targets, and the distant timeframes often
associated with such targets can pose a challenge in ensuring
accountability.247 Nonetheless, these instruments could be

242. See Light & Orts, supra note 134, at 69 (arguing that supply chain
standards imposed by contract are more durable than standards a firm
imposes on itself).
243. See, e.g., id. at 43 (discussing the Equator Principles, which require
financial firms to undertake environmental impact assessments when making
loans to support large-scale infrastructure projects).
244. See Kristin Broughton, Companies Test a New Type of ESG Bond with
Fewer Restrictions, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://perma.cc/FBK8DC4S (stating that sustainability-linked bonds are usually structured so that
companies pay a higher interest rate to investors if they fail to achieve
environmental goals before the maturity date). In contrast to traditional green
bonds, whose proceeds must be used for “green” or environmentally oriented
projects, sustainability-linked bonds’ proceeds may be used for general
business purposes and are generally subject to less burdensome disclosure
requirements. Id.
245. See Dawn Lim, BlackRock Must Hit ESG Targets or Pay More to
Borrow Money, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2021, 12:30 AM), https://perma.cc/96PVP9V2 (discussing the firm’s commitment to sustainable-business goals to keep
its corporate borrowing costs down).
246. See INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N, SUSTAINABILITY-LINKED BOND PRINCIPLES:
VOLUNTARY PROCESS GUIDELINES 2 (2020), https://perma.cc/Q9DT-8QHH
(PDF) (listing verification as one of the five core components of the
Sustainability-Linked Bond Principles).
247. See Levin et al., What Does “Net-Zero Emissions Mean?, supra note
227 (arguing that decision-makers must take distant timelines into account by
establishing near-term milestones on the path to net zero emissions).
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designed to assess a company’s performance in terms of interim
targets or concrete goals. For example, a company might be
expected to reduce net carbon emissions 50 percent by 2025 or
to use energy only from renewable sources by 2025.
Other types of contracts could incorporate net zero targets
in whole or in part. Development agreements between a
company and a local government or good neighbor agreements
between a company and a community might incorporate
elements of net zero implementation plans.248 Settlements of
environmental lawsuits also might include net zero targets.249
Climate change-related public nuisance claims against major oil
companies may be logical candidates for such settlements, as at
least some of the primary defendants in such cases—BP, Shell,
Occidental, and Total—have made net zero pledges.250
Similarly, companies that are being prosecuted for
environmental violations could be required to meet net zero
targets as part of a consent decree.251 Many companies that have
made net zero pledges have also been the subject of serious or
multiple environmental prosecutions in recent years—including

248. See DOUGLAS KENNEY ET AL., NAT. RES. L. CTR., EVALUATING THE USE
OF GOOD NEIGHBOR AGREEMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND COMMUNITY
PROTECTION: FINAL REPORT 13–14 (2004) (stating that environmental good

neighbor agreements are rare, but that case studies suggest that they are
effective when used in appropriate circumstances).
249. See, e.g., Michael Wines, Duke Energy to Pay Fine Over Power Plant
Violations, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc/6ZQA-GBTW
(discussing Duke Energy’s settlement regarding the violation of Clean Air Act
regulations in the 1990s).
250. See, e.g., Complaint at 13–14, 58–63, City of New York v. BP et al.,
325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18 Civ. 182) (stating that the
defendants’ conduct constitutes substantial and unreasonable interference
with and obstruction of public rights and property); see also County of San
Mateo v. Chevron et al., 295 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (explaining
that the claim against the defendants was that their contributions to
greenhouse gas emissions constituted a “substantial and unreasonable
interference with public rights”).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Alcoa, 533 F.3d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 2008)
(stating that defendant company entered into a consent decree that permitted
construction of a new power plant with specified emissions limitations after
being sued for a violation of the Clean Air Act).
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Volkswagen,252 GM,253 Duke Energy,254 Xcel Energy,255 and Rio
Tinto.256 Incorporating net zero targets into settlements of
nonenvironmental violations would reach an even broader
range of companies.
4.

Enforcement by Consumers and Investors

Consumers and investors also can pressure corporations to
make and implement net zero pledges. Tools of consumer
pressure
include
not
only
individual
purchasing

252. See What Becoming ‘Carbon Neutral’ Means to Volkswagen—and Why
It’s the Only Way Forward, VOLKSWAGEN (June 24, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3MHL-5S83 (pledging carbon neutrality by 2050). In 2016
and 2017, Volkswagen entered into multibillion dollar settlements with the
EPA to resolve claims that it sold 590,000 vehicles equipped with computer
software designed to cheat on emissions tests. See Volkswagen Clean Air Act
Civil Settlement, EPA, https://perma.cc/S84N-LALG (“These settlements
resolve allegations that Volkswagen violated the Clean Air Act by the sale of
approximately 590,000 model year 2009 to 2016 diesel motor vehicles equipped
with ‘defeat devices.’”).
253. See General Motors, the Largest U.S. Automaker, Plans to Be Carbon
Neutral by 2040, GENERAL MOTORS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/ULL3A6ZF (pledging carbon neutrality by 2040). See Violation Tracker Parent
Company Summary, GOOD JOBS FIRST (2021), https://perma.cc/JS8F-33E8, for
a list of legal violations by GM, including environmental violations.
254. See Duke Energy Aims to Achieve Net-Zero Carbon Emissions by 2050,
DUKE ENERGY (Sept. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/Y4LH-E85M (pledging to
achieve net zero carbon emissions by 2050). In 2015, Duke’s subsidiaries
pleaded guilty to criminal violations of the Clean Water Act resulting from a
coal ash spill and agreed to pay over $100 million in fines and environmental
projects. See Summary of Criminal Prosecutions, EPA, https://perma.cc/7G5SRBRJ. In the same year, Duke also agreed to pay over $5 million to settle
alleged Clean Air Act violations. See Wines, supra note 249 (stating that the
settlement will finance projects ranging from electric-vehicle charging stations
at rest stops to the replacement of wood burning stoves).
255. See Planning Our Clean Energy Future, XCEL ENERGY,
https://perma.cc/23TY-83ZH (pledging to produce carbon-free electricity by
2050). See Violation Tracker Parent Company Summary, GOOD JOBS FIRST,
https://perma.cc/3SH2-BH76, for a list of legal violations by Xcel, including
environmental violations.
256. See Climate Change, RIO TINTO (2020), https://perma.cc/KS74-GQMM
(announcing ambition to achieve net zero by 2050); see also Livia
Albeck-Ripka, Abandoned Rio Tinto Mine Is Blamed for Poisoned Bougainville
Rivers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/PPU3-HHUL (reporting
on alleged environmental and human rights violations arising out of Rio
Tinto’s failure to clean up an abandoned mine in Papua New Guinea).
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behavior—which may be of limited effectiveness257—but also
boycotts and other campaigns aimed at pressuring target
companies as well as institutions and organizations associated
with them.258 Reputational harm may undermine a company’s
ability to attract employees and customers.259
Tools of investor pressure include climate-related
divestment initiatives, screening out of carbon-intensive
investments, and shareholder resolutions, all of which can focus
the attention of management and the public on climate issues.260
However, the impact of such efforts to date is uncertain.
Climate-related divestment initiatives apparently have been too
modest to affect share prices, and climate-related shareholder
resolutions often receive a small share of votes.261 The basic
tenets of corporate law—including shareholder primacy and the
for-profit nature of corporations—appear quite difficult for such
efforts to overcome.262
Nonetheless, net zero commitments by major investors
themselves could play a critical role in ensuring that
corporations carry out their net zero pledges. Especially
257. See supra text accompanying notes 133–135.
258. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global
Governance, 83 TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2152–53 (2005); R. Henry Weaver, Is
Consumer Activism Economic Democracy?, 22 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 241,
256–67 (2019).
259. See Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow, Harnessing Investor Interest
in Sustainability: The Next Frontier in Environmental Information
Regulation, 36 YALE J. REG. 625, 632–33 (2019).
260. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 146–47; Peter
Newell, Civil Society, Corporate Accountability and the Politics of Climate
Change, 8 GLOB. ENV’T POL. 122, 142 (2008).
261. See VANDENBERGH & GILLIGAN, supra note 124, at 146–47 (stating
that although climate-related resolutions typically receive only a small share
of votes, they still attract publicity and increase pressure for emissions
disclosure and reductions); see also Jonathan M. Gilligan, Carrots and Sticks
in Private Environmental Governance, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 179, 190 (2018)
(discussing analyses generally finding “no important impact of divestment
campaigns on share prices”).
262. See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social
Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1416–18 (2020) (suggesting that voluntarily
expending resources on sustainable outcomes might run afoul of boards’ and
managers’ duties); see also Newell, supra note 260, at 148 (noting that
governance through such nonstate actors tends to yield forms of accountability
that are “temporary, unenforceable, [and] subject to tokenism and publicity
cycles”).
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important, Vanguard and other large asset managers have
turned to ESG as a tool for mitigating risks because they cannot
readily liquidate or diversify their holdings.263 Bound by their
fund strategies to hold shares in specific companies or
industries, these managers adopt a longer-term approach to
shareholder value that takes into account at least some factors
that may escape quarterly earnings reports.264 Under the Paris
Aligned Investment Initiative’s Net Zero Asset Owners
Commitment, the leading investor effort on net zero, investors
agree to achieve net zero portfolios by 2050 or sooner and to set
interim emission reduction targets for 2030 or sooner.265 The
investors that have entered into this commitment, representing
some $33 trillion in total investments, are supported by a
framework that assists asset owners and managers in
implementing their commitments.266
C.

Enforcement of Government Net Zero Targets

Although the foregoing enforcement mechanisms may not
be available against governments, public entities’ net zero
commitments might be enforced in some countries through
statutory, constitutional, or human rights litigation.
In the United States, separation-of-powers concerns and
justiciability doctrines make it unlikely that a court would issue
an order enforcing a broad net zero target. The Juliana267
litigation, where plaintiffs sought to vindicate their alleged right
to a “climate system capable of sustaining human life,” suggests
how a court might approach a net zero-based claim.268 In
Juliana, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’
263. See Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 262, at 1449 (noting that
BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard, which have started to support ESG
efforts, each “controls, on average, 5% to 8% of every publicly traded U.S.
company, often qualifying as the biggest shareholder”).
264. See id. at 1449–57; see also Gilligan, supra note 261, at 186–87.
265. Press Release, Ceres, New Global Effort Launches for Investors to
Achieve Net-Zero Portfolios in Line with the Paris Agreement Goals (Mar. 10,
2021).
266. See INST. INV. GRP. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, NET ZERO INVESTMENT
FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 5 (2021), https://perma.cc/7W4J-TLWD
(PDF).
267. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
268. Id. at 1164 (internal quotation omitted).
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claims—rooted in due process and public trust doctrine—for
lack of standing.269 The court explained that only the political
branches, not the courts, could redress the plaintiffs’ injuries by
requiring “the government to develop a plan to ‘phase out fossil
fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2.’”270
Efforts to enforce a net zero target against the federal
government would likely encounter similar judicial reluctance.
Cases in Canada271 and the United Kingdom272 involving
analogous claims have come out similarly.
Incorporating net zero targets into law may enhance
prospects for enforcement in some countries. A prominent
example of such legislation is the United Kingdom’s Climate
Change Act,273 which establishes a goal of achieving net zero by
2050, requires the establishment of five-year carbon budgets,
and mandates regular reporting of emissions and budget
implementation.274 Similar legislation in Canada requires its
environmental minister to set periodic carbon reduction targets
(or “milestones”) every five years and to establish a GHG
emission reduction plan for achieving each target, with the
objective of attaining net zero by 2050.275 Aside from declaring a
net zero target date, such legislation can establish frameworks
that promote coordination, collaboration, transparency, and
accountability.276 Denmark’s climate law, for instance, not only
269. See id. at 1164–65 (“[T]he plaintiffs’ impressive case for redress must
be presented to the political branches of government.”).
270. Id.
271. See La Rose et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2020] F.C. 1008, 23
(Can.) (dismissing claims that Canada’s weak climate policy violated plaintiffs’
constitutional rights as nonjusticiable and failing to state a reasonable cause
of action).
272. See Plan B Earth & Others v. Secretary of State [2018] EWHC 1892
(Eng.), appeal denied, [2019] No. C1/2018/1750 (Eng.) (dismissing claims that
the U.K. government had a public sector equality duty to limit global
temperature rises by reducing emissions for failure to state a claim).
273. Climate Change Act 2008, c. 27 (UK).
274. Id. §§ 1, 4, 14, 16, 18.
275. Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, S.C. 2020, c. C-12,
§§ 6–10 (Can.).
276. See CANADIAN INST. FOR CLIMATE CHOICES, MARKING THE WAY: HOW
LEGISLATING CLIMATE MILESTONES CLARIFIES PATHWAYS TO LONG TERM GOALS
ix (2020), https://perma.cc/W2AK-2KWV (PDF). If a target is not met, the
minister must explain why and describe measures being taken to address such
failure. Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, § 16; see also David
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sets target dates for reducing and eliminating emissions but also
requires the government to obtain parliamentary approval of its
climate strategies each year.277
In some countries, rights-based or statute-based litigation
may offer an avenue for enforcing governmental net zero targets
or pathways even if the targets themselves are not enshrined in
law. Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, for example, held
in Neubauer278 that the German federal government has a duty
to develop a long-term climate strategy consistent with the Paris
Agreement.279 The government’s failure to specify emissions
reductions beyond 2030, the court explained, violated
constitutional rights to “a future in accordance with human
dignity” and to “an ecological minimum standard of living.”280
Although Germany had enacted a law detailing strategies for
achieving a 55 percent reduction in emissions by 2030, the court
noted that the law “irreversibly offload[ed] major emission
reduction burdens onto periods after 2030.”281 The court ordered
the government “at the very least [to] determine the size of the
annual emission amounts to be set for periods after 2030 itself
or impose more detailed requirements for their definition by the
executive authority.”282 In recognizing a duty to develop a
long-term climate strategy consistent with the Paris Agreement,
V. Wright, Bill C-12, Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act: A
Preliminary Review, ABLAWG (Nov. 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/67WF-US7X
(describing the compliance mechanisms of Bill C-12).
277. Jocelyn Timperley, The Law that Could Make Climate Change Illegal,
BBC FUTURE PLANET (July 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/SER4-939M.
278. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Mar. 24, 2021, 1 BvR 2656/18, https://perma.cc/RDC8-C2UY (Ger.).
279. See Constitutional Complaints Against the Federal Climate Change
Act Partially Successful, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (Apr. 29, 2021),
https://perma.cc/Z6XA-ZZ2K (reporting the court’s holding that “emissions
amounts allowed until 2030 are incompatible with fundamental rights insofar
as they lack sufficient specifications for further emission reductions from 2031
onwards”). Unofficial translation of full decision available at: Neubauer et al.
v. Germany, https://perma.cc/RDC8-C2UY (PDF).
280. Constitutional Complaints, supra note 279.
281. Id.
282. Id. In response to the decision, German officials have proposed to
achieve net zero by 2045, reduce GHG emissions 88 percent by 2040, and boost
Germany’s 2030 emissions reduction target from 55 percent to 65 percent.
David Rising & Frank Jordans, Germany Aims for Net Zero Emissions by 2045,
5 Years Earlier, AP NEWS (May 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/X8RP-J258.
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Neubauer could serve as a foundation for a procedural duty to
develop not only a net zero target but also a detailed strategy for
achieving such a target.283
In another rights-based decision, the Netherlands’ Supreme
Court in Urgenda284 upheld a lower court mandate that the
Netherlands adopt measures to reduce GHG emissions to 25
percent below 1990 levels by 2020.285 At issue were European
Convention on Human Rights provisions guaranteeing rights to
life, private life, and family life.286 The court interpreted these
provisions in the context of climate change as obliging member
states to do their part to reduce GHG emissions.287 In light of
the 25–40 percent range of emissions reductions expected of
developed countries, the court found the 17 percent reduction
provided for under existing law inadequate.288 Rejecting the
contention that a judicial mandate to reduce emissions by 25
percent impermissibly required the government to create
legislation, the court explained that the government remained
free to determine the specific measures it would adopt.289 While
Urgenda does not address long-term mitigation goals, its
reasoning could support a substantive obligation to adopt
adequate measures to achieve net zero goals.290

283. Another relevant decision in this regard is Friends of the Environment
v. Ireland. Relying on a statute that required the preparation of a mitigation
plan for achieving a climate resilient and environmentally sustainable
economy by 2050, the Irish Supreme Court ordered the Irish government to
write a more detailed plan than the one it had prepared. Friends of the Irish
Environment v. The Government of Ireland & Others [2020] IESC 49, ¶ 9.2
(Ir.).
284. HR
20
december
2020,
ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007
(Netherlands/Stichting Urgenda) (Neth.).
285. Id. ¶ 2.2.1.
286. See id. ¶¶ 5.2.1–5.3.2.
287. See id. ¶¶ 5.8, 6.1.
288. See id. ¶ 7.5.1 (explaining that the Netherlands should reduce
emissions by at least 25 percent).
289. See id. ¶ 8.2.7.
290. Cf. Complaint at 41–42, Městský soudu v Praze podáno ze dne
21.04.2021 (MS) [Filed with the Circuit Court in the City of Prague on Apr. 21,
2021] (Czech), https://perma.cc/DZ6X-NPQV; Complaint at Annex ¶ 29–32,
Cláudia Duarte Agostinho & Others v. Portugal & 32 Other States, No.
39371/20 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/SJ5T-BFGH
(complaint, filed with the European Court of Human Rights against
thirty-three European countries, seeking an order that each defendant nation
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Decisions challenging governments’ failure to implement
climate plans or policies suggest a possible basis for compelling
the implementation of net zero policies. In Leghari,291 for
example, Pakistan’s Lahore High Court held that “the delay and
lethargy of the State in implementing the [nation’s climate
change policy framework] offends the fundamental
[constitutional] rights of the citizens.”292 The court ordered the
government defendants to nominate a “climate change focal
person” within each relevant ministry “to ensure the
implementation of the Framework” and to establish a
commission to assist the court in monitoring implementation.293
Although the case focused primarily on enforcing climate
adaptation rather than climate mitigation efforts, it hints that
some courts may be willing to compel implementation of net zero
policies.294
IV. NET ZERO AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CARBON
MITIGATION AND CARBON REMOVAL
Net zero commitments, if carried out, could contribute
significantly to meeting Paris’s temperature goals. How
governments and corporations actually implement net zero
pledges will be critical in determining whether those goals will
be met and what a carbon-stabilized world will look like.
Although net zero implies that carbon emissions will be
balanced out by carbon removal, an important question that
most net zero pledges have yet to address is whether to set
distinct targets for carbon mitigation and carbon removal. This
Part explains that important differences between the two, along

adopt mitigation measures reflecting a “fair share” of the global burden of
mitigating climate change).
291. Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan & Others, (2015) WP No.
25501/2015 (Lahore High Court) 6 (Pak.), https://perma.cc/H4RZ-W9QP.
292. Id. at 6.
293. Id. at 6–7.
294. Similarly, in Srestha v. Office of the Prime Minister, the Nepal
Supreme Court ordered the drafting and implementation of a law specifically
addressing climate change mitigation and adaptation, and in the meantime,
ordered adherence to existing climate change policy and adaptation plans. See
Srestha v. Office of the Prime Minister, 074-WO-0283 (Dec. 25, 2018), 13
(Nepal), https://perma.cc/PXZ2-GWMV.
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with the potential for carbon removal to undermine carbon
mitigation efforts, warrant separate targets.
A.

Existing Policies Linking Carbon Mitigation and Carbon
Removal

Net zero pledges build on various policies that already link
carbon mitigation and carbon removal. Such policies might be
viewed as weak precedents against setting distinct carbon
mitigation and removal goals within net zero targets. The Kyoto
Protocol, the Paris Agreement’s predecessor, calculated parties’
compliance with emissions caps by including carbon removed
from the atmosphere via land use change.295 The Paris
Agreement, in calling for “a balance between anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks,” suggests that
emissions
reductions
and
carbon
removal
are
interchangeable.296 Furthermore, various carbon markets
recognize the fungibility of emissions reductions and some types
of carbon removal.
1.

The Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol, which required developed countries to
limit their GHG emissions, effectively treated certain types of
land-based carbon removal as equivalent to mitigation in
determining whether countries met their emission targets.297
Specifically, each developed country party calculated its
emissions by including “greenhouse gas emissions by sources
and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced
land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation,
reforestation and deforestation since 1990.”298 Subsequent
295. See Reporting and Accounting of LULUCF Activities Under the Kyoto
Protocol, UN CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/7B7F-6X8Y (stating that the
net change in carbon and greenhouse emissions from land use change “shall
be used to meet the commitments referred to in” the Kyoto Protocol).
296. Paris Agreement, supra note 18, art. 4.1.
297. See Neil Craik & William C.G. Burns, Climate Engineering Under the
Paris Agreement, 49 ENV’T L. REP. 11113, 11116 (2019) (explaining that
improved land management and forestry are well-understood as part of
existing management strategies).
298. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, art. 3.3, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/1997/L,7/ADD.1, 37 I.L.M. 32.
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decisions integrated additional types of land-based carbon
removal—forest management, cropland management, grazing
land management, revegetation, and wetlands drainage and
rewetting—into these calculations.299
2.

The Paris Agreement

As explained above, the Paris Agreement incorporates the
net zero concept in its call for “a balance between anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks.”300 Consistent with
this language, the agreement urges parties “to conserve and
enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse
gases . . . including forests.”301
Indeed, much of the modeling underlying Paris’s
temperature goals assumes ambitious amounts of carbon
removal.302 The modeled scenarios analyzed pathways for
achieving specific climate goals in a cost-effective manner using
a combination of carbon removal and mitigation techniques.303
Under these scenarios, achieving the 1.5°C goal will require
large-scale carbon removal,304 and even the 2°C goal assumes
significant carbon removal unless mitigation efforts
dramatically escalate.305 Seven years after negotiation of the
299. See MACE ET AL., supra note 62, at 17 (noting that decisions gave
developed countries the option to include net emissions and removals from
other designated land management activities in calculating total emissions);
Annex to Decision 16/CMP.1 Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8, at 6 (Mar. 30, 2006), https://perma.cc/V3APG5MN (providing guidance on how signatories may counterbalance
emissions); Annex to Decision 2/CMP.7 Land Use, Land-Use Change and
Forestry, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1, at 13–14 (Mar. 15, 2012),
https://perma.cc/56AZ-THEN (same). To address concerns regarding the
verifiability and permanence of land-based carbon removals, parties could rely
on such removals to satisfy only part of their compliance obligations. See MACE
ET AL., supra note 62, at 17 (detailing the carbon removal potential).
300. See Paris Agreement, supra note 18.
301. Id. art. 5.1.
302. See Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal, supra note 43, at 549
(characterizing the feasibility of carbon dioxide removal predicted by some
models as “highly questionable”).
303. See Minx et al., supra note 37, at 2–3.
304. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 121–22.
305. See Minx et al., supra note 37, at 13 (“[M]any
commentators . . . suggest a large-scale dependence on negative emissions for
2°C scenarios . . . .”); ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 37, at 13 (“Only very dramatic
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Paris Agreement, as many countries struggle to meet their
already inadequate climate pledges,306 even greater reliance on
carbon removal will likely be necessary to achieve Paris’s
temperature goals.
Parties’ initial NDCs focused primarily on emission
reductions, with little mention of carbon removal except in
conjunction with forest management.307 However, carbon
removal activities are poised to play a more prominent role over
time.308 The NDCs are to be revised every five years, with each
successive NDC “represent[ing] a progression” beyond parties’
previous commitments.309 Parties are also encouraged to
prepare nonbinding “long-term low greenhouse gas emission
development strategies” to guide the development of successive
NDCs.310 Although most strategies submitted to date rely
exclusively on emissions reductions, an increasing number of
them refer to forest management and other types of carbon
removal.311 For example, Japan’s strategy highlights CCS and
calls for further work on DACS and other carbon removal

and rapid emissions reduction will allow the 2°C target to be met without”
carbon removal technologies); see also Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal, supra
note 43, at 549.
306. See EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2021, supra note 15, at xix–xx (noting that
G20 members are not on track to meet either their original or revised NDCs);
Sachs, supra note 164, at 892–93.
307. See MACE ET AL., supra note 62, at 26 (highlighting guidance for
reporting emissions from harvesting wood products). One quarter of mitigation
pledged in NDCs arises from improved forest management. See ROYAL SOC’Y,
supra note 37, at 28 (citing examples of deforestation reduction goals in Brazil
and Mexico).
308. See Craik & Burns, supra note 297, at 11121 (contending that states
may “integrat[e] some [carbon removal] technologies into their reduction
commitments since removals of CO2 are expressly contemplated as an element
of mitigation” under the Paris Agreement).
309. Paris Agreement, supra note 18, art. 4.3, 4.9.
310. Id. art. 4.19; see Mafalda Duarte, Marching Toward 2050: Purpose
and Elements of Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development
Strategies, WORLD RES. INST., https://perma.cc/ZXF7-L575. The strategies are
available at Communication of Long-Term Strategies, UN CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://perma.cc/9L66-2ER3.
311. See MACE ET AL., supra note 62, at 26–27 (outlining current
provisions).
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techniques.312 Similarly, the United Kingdom’s strategy
advocates research, development, and incentives to
“strengthen . . . understanding of [carbon removal] technologies
and, where appropriate, move forward with deployment.”313
3.

Carbon Markets

Carbon markets that allow trading of carbon removal-based
offsets offer perhaps the most prominent example of the
equivalent treatment of carbon emissions reductions and carbon
removals. Under cap-and-trade carbon markets, a regulator sets
an overall cap on GHG emissions and allocates allowances
representing a right to emit a defined quantity of GHGs.314
States, companies, or other sources must surrender allowances
reflecting the amount of GHGs emitted.315 These entities can
trade allowances with each other and thereby choose either to
reduce their own emissions directly or to pay other entities to
make equivalent emissions reductions on their behalf.316 Under
some regimes, sources also may meet their compliance
obligations by relying on offsets generated by entities that
voluntarily remove carbon from the atmosphere.317 Offsets are

312. Government of Japan, The Long-Term Strategy Under the Paris
Agreement, at 16, 26, 36, 79–81 (2019) (discussing Japan’s efforts and strategy
for carbon reduction).
313. GOV. OF THE U.K., THE CLEAN GROWTH STRATEGY: LEADING THE WAY
TO A LOW CARBON FUTURE 57 (2018); see also Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25,
at 24–25 (highlighting that the United Kingdom is currently the leader in
integrating carbon removal into climate policy).
314. See Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to
Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 293, 298 (2008) (explaining
the basics of cap and trade).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See ERIC MARLAND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING AND ANALYSIS: THE
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD FOREST OFFSET PROTOCOL 1 (Springer eds.,
1st ed. 2017) (outlining California’s carbon offset regime); van Kooten, supra
note 43, at 84 (stating that “most governments and international negotiations
consider emissions trading to be the main policy vehicle”).
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available most commonly for forestry-related carbon removal318
and less frequently for other carbon removal techniques.319
a.

Forestry Offset Credits

California’s cap and trade regime allows regulated entities
to rely in part on offsets to meet their caps, including offsets
from forestry projects.320 A ceiling on entities’ use of offsets
tacitly recognizes that the offsets do not represent carbon
benefits wholly equivalent to direct carbon mitigation.321 A
specific protocol governs programs involving reforestation,
improved forest management, and avoided conversion of forests
to non-forest land use.322 Carbon benefits must be additional,
permanent, and verifiable.323 To account for the risk of
leakage—i.e., that projects’ carbon benefits will be undermined

318. See Wytze van der Gaast et al., The Contribution of Forest Carbon
Credit Projects to Addressing the Climate Change Challenge, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y
42, 43 (2018) (explaining that forestry-related carbon offsets have been
promoted by public funds that assist governments in their forest
management).
319. Various reports have advocated for the integration of carbon removal
into carbon markets. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note
35, at 133; ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 37, at 11.
320. See MARLAND ET AL., supra note 317, at 6 (indicating that 58 percent
of all offset credits issued in California were related to forest projects).
321. From 2013 to 2020, use of offsets was restricted to 8 percent of an
entity’s overall GHG compliance obligations. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17,
§ 95854(b) (2011). Legislation extending California’s cap and trade regime to
2030 similarly restricts offset use. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 38562(b)(2)(E) (limiting offset use to 4 percent of an entity’s compliance
obligations from 2021 to 2025 and 6 percent from 2026 to 2030 and requiring
that half the offsets come from projects that provide direct environmental
benefits to California).
322. See CAL. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., COMPLIANCE OFFSETS
PROTOCOL: U.S. FOREST PROJECTS (2011), https://perma.cc/2LJL-248S; CAL.
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., COMPLIANCE OFFSETS PROTOCOL: U.S.
FOREST PROJECTS (2014), https://perma.cc/7FDR-D67B; CAL. ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., COMPLIANCE OFFSETS PROTOCOL: U.S. FOREST PROJECTS
(2015)
[hereinafter
2015
COMPLIANCE
OFFSETS
PROTOCOL],
https://perma.cc/D54S-82KM.
323. 2015 COMPLIANCE OFFSETS PROTOCOL, supra note 322, at 25 (2015);
see Tatyana Ruseva et al., Additionality and Permanence Standards in
California’s Forest Offset Protocol: A Review of Project and Program Level
Implications, 198 J. ENV’T MGMT. 277, 279 (2017).
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by carbon releases elsewhere—offsets are discounted.324 In
addition, a fraction of offsets are set aside in a buffer account
and retired if fires or other events result in unintended carbon
release.325 Although forestry projects have accounted for the
majority of California’s offset credits,326 high transaction costs,
complicated procedures, extensive commitment periods, and low
and
inconsistent
carbon
prices
have
discouraged
participation.327
Australia has granted carbon offsets not only for forest
carbon management but also for other specified land
management activities. Under the country’s Carbon Farming
Initiative, landowners generated carbon credits through
activities that sequestered carbon “in living biomass, dead
organic matter or soil,” including afforestation, reforestation,
and soil sequestration.328 Initially, industry could use these
credits to satisfy up to 5 percent of their carbon tax
obligations.329 Australia subsequently replaced its carbon tax
324. For a critical view of whether CARB has adequately accounted for
leakage, see Barbara Haya, Policy Brief: The California Air Resources Board’s
U.S.
Forest
Offset
Protocol
Underestimates
Leakage
(2019),
https://perma.cc/D5G9-A8HY (PDF).
325. 2015 COMPLIANCE OFFSETS PROTOCOL, supra note 322, at app. D; see
Ruseva et al., supra note 323, at 280 (explaining the purpose and use of the
buffer account).
326. See Chaeri Kim & Thomas Daniels, California’s Success in the
Socio-Ecological Practice of a Forest Carbon Offset Credit Option to Mitigate
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 1 SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL PRAC. RSCH. 125, 131 (2019)
(detailing the forests accounting for the credits).
327. See MARLAND ET AL., supra note 317, at 53–54, 66 (discussing costs
and other barriers); Nicolena vonHedemann et al., Forest Policy and
Management Approaches for Carbon Dioxide Removal, 10 INTERFACE FOCUS 1,
10 (2020). The low price of carbon has been blamed for the negligible forestry
projects undertaken in another domestic carbon market, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). Id. at 10.
328. Megan C. Evans, Effective Incentives for Reforestation: Lessons from
Australia’s Carbon Farming Policies, 32 CURRENT OP. ENV’T SUSTAINABILITY
38, 39 (2018); Jonathan Verschuuren, Towards a Regulatory Design for
Reducing Emissions from Agriculture: Lessons from Australia’s Carbon
Farming Initiative, 7 CLIMATE L. 1, 16 (2017).
329. Ing-Marie Gren & Abenezer Zeleke Aklilu, Policy Design for Forest
Carbon Sequestration: A Review of the Literature, 70 FOREST POL’Y & ECON.
128, 133 (2016); Verschuuren, supra note 328, at 15. Australia’s 2011 Clean
Energy Act, later repealed, provided for a carbon tax on industry for
2012– 2015, followed by a cap-and-trade scheme to apply beginning July 2015.
Id. at 14.
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with a voluntary program to subsidize carbon abatement.330
Now, businesses that register carbon reduction or removal
projects can earn carbon credits and then sell those credits to
the government through a reverse auction.331 Forest-based
sequestration (especially conversion of agricultural land to
forests) has accounted for most of the funded projects.332
At the international level, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) was expected to serve as an
important carbon market for forest-based carbon removal.333
Under this emissions trading scheme, emissions reduction
projects and forest-related carbon removal projects in
developing countries could generate carbon offsets, and
developed countries could purchase these offsets in lieu of
reducing their own emissions.334 Though projected to be
significant sources of credits, afforestation and reforestation
projects ultimately constituted less than 1 percent of CDM
projects.335 The European Union refused to accept credits from
330. See Evans, supra note 328, at 39.
331. See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, THE EMISSIONS REDUCTION
FUND—WHAT IT MEANS FOR YOU 7–8 (2019), https://perma.cc/7U6Z-47ZH
(PDF). Critics have attacked the use of public money to pay for these projects
and questioned their additionality and permanence, noting that some projects
may be terminated after only twenty-five years. See Adam Morton, Up in
Smoke: What Did Taxpayers Get for the $2bn Emissions Fund?, GUARDIAN
(June 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/J3KN-UY38 (profiling potential issues with
the program); Evans, supra note 328, at 41 (same).
332. See Schenuit et al., supra note 83, at 10–11 (citing this method as the
primary climate policy instrument in Australia); Courtney M. Regan et al., The
Influence of Crediting and Permanence Periods on Australian Forest-Based
Carbon Offset Supply, 97 LAND USE POL’Y 104800, 2020, at 2 (noting that
“[f]orest-based sequestration methods accounted for approximately 81 percent
of the total AUD $2.29 billion spent on all projects” at the date of the article’s
publication); Morton, supra note 331 (stating that “vegetation projects,”
including “regenerating degraded habitat, tree-planting and ‘avoided
deforestation’” are expected to deliver two-thirds of the effects of Australia’s
emissions reductions fund).
333. See Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal, supra note 43, at 552.
334. See id. at 553–57 (noting criticism of CDM’s potential to reward
actions that generate GHG credits but fail to make a positive environmental
impact).
335. See vonHedemann, supra note 327, at 4 (2020) (highlighting that
those projects were 0.9 percent of over 7,000 CDM projects); ROSS W. GORTE &
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34560, FOREST CARBON
MARKETS: POTENTIAL AND DRAWBACKS 3 (2008) (citing that afforestation and
reforestation have only accounted for 0.3 percent).
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CDM forestry projects in its Emissions Trading System, citing
concerns about leakage, permanence, and accounting.336 The
long timescale associated with forestry projects and the
temporary nature of any credits that might be granted also
made forestry projects relatively unattractive.337
The limitations placed on recognizing carbon credits from
forest management reflect a view that carbon removal by forests
warrants encouragement but is not quite equivalent to carbon
mitigation. At the same time, modest levels of participation in
such projects suggests that additional incentives—and
safeguards—may be necessary to encourage desired types of
carbon removal.
b.

Credits from Non-Forestry Carbon Removal Projects

The granting of carbon offsets for engineered carbon
removal, such as the generous offsets for DACS available under
amendments to California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS),
likewise suggests a degree of interchangeability between
emissions reductions and carbon removal. Established in 2006,
the LCFS aims to reduce the carbon intensity of transportation
fuels sold in California.338 When a distributor sells fuel having a
greater carbon intensity than specified targets, it must obtain
LCFS credits to compensate for the excess carbon.339
Amendments to the statutory scheme now allow for the issuance
of LCFS credits for the storage of carbon captured directly from

336. See vonHedemann et al., supra note 327, at 4.
337. See id. The Paris Agreement contains several potential tools for
promoting forest-based carbon removal. Article 6 of the agreement allows
parties to transfer or share emission reductions from reduced deforestation
and to engage in trading of carbon credits under the yet-to-be defined successor
to the CDM, the Sustainable Development Mechanism. Paris Agreement art.
6.1, 6.4, , supra note 18; see also Honegger & Reiner, supra note 35, at 315–16
(noting the importance of ensuring credible accounting, keeping transaction
costs low, and facilitating financial transfers in any mechanism that
incorporates carbon removal projects).
338. See ALEX TOWNSEND & IAN HAVERCROFT, THE LCFS AND CCS
PROTOCOL: AN OVERVIEW FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PROJECT DEVELOPERS 4
(2019).
339. See id. at 7 (adding that this rule applies to fuel providers who
“produce, import, distribute, or sell transportation fuels in California”).
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the air,340 provided that an operator demonstrates a greater
than 90 percent probability that at least 99 percent of the carbon
will be stored for at least one hundred years.341 Credits can be
granted regardless of project location.342
The value of LCFS credits, which have averaged close to
$200 per ton, could offer a powerful incentive for DACS projects
worldwide.343 Even though credit prices are projected to drop
towards $100 per ton in the current decade,344 they would
remain an order of magnitude greater than the price of credits
arising from forestry projects.345 The potential to combine LCFS
credits with other incentives could make DACS projects
especially attractive.346
One such incentive, available under Section 45Q of the
Internal Revenue Code, is a tax credit of up to $50 per ton for
the permanent underground storage of at least 100,000 tons of
CO2 from the ambient air.347 The 45Q credit was originally

340. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95490(a); TOWNSEND & HAVERCROFT, supra
note 338, at 9. The revised LCFS also authorizes credits for the storage of
carbon captured from transportation fuel production processes, provided that
the fuel is sold in California, and it allows fuels produced using carbon
captured from the air to qualify as low carbon fuels so long as they are sold in
California. See JOHN LARSEN ET AL., CAPTURING LEADERSHIP: POLICIES FOR THE
US TO ADVANCE DIRECT AIR CAPTURE TECHNOLOGY 23 (2019) (“For every net
ton of CO2 removed from the atmosphere and permanently stored, [Direct Air
Capture (DAC)] facilities receive LCFS credits.”).
341. TOWNSEND & HAVERCROFT, supra note 338, at 10.
342. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95490(b)(3).
343. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 53.
344. LARSEN ET AL., supra note 340, at 23.
345. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 53. Forestry
offset credits trade in the range of thirteen to fifteen dollars per ton in
California’s carbon market. See Ryan Dezember, Preserving Trees Becomes Big
Business, Driven by Emissions Rules, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2020, 5:42 AM),
https://perma.cc/3WWR-S27L (“California credits changed hands at an
average of $14.15 in 2019 and were up to $15 before the coronavirus lockdown
drove them lower. They have lately traded for about $13.”).
346. See TOWNSEND & HAVERCROFT, supra note 338, at 20 (“In combination,
LCFS credits and 45Q tax credits could provide CCS project developers in the
US with a strong financial incentive to capture CO2 emissions and invest in
CCS.”).
347. 26 U.S.C. § 45Q(a), (b), (d)(2)(C), (e)(1). Project construction must
begin by January 1, 2026 in order to take advantage of the credit. See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 133 (2020)
(extending the carbon dioxide sequestration credit by two years).
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limited to CCS projects at power plants and other
GHG-generating facilities.348 Congress expanded the tax credit
to DACS in 2018, recognizing the value of carbon sequestration
regardless of whether the carbon was captured from the air or
from power plant exhaust.349 Although the tax credit alone
appears insufficient to incentivize DACS or the capture and
storage of industrial emissions,350 combining the tax credit with
LCFS credits or other incentives could make DACS projects
financially viable.351
B.

Comparing Mitigation and Carbon Removal

Policies
linking
carbon
mitigation
and
carbon
removal—including the net zero concept—reflect the
atmospheric equivalence of a ton of carbon emissions avoided
and a ton of carbon removed. Carbon mitigation and carbon
removal nonetheless differ in important ways. Equivalent
treatment of the two ignores differences in verifiability,
permanence, feasibility, and risks. Ultimately, these differences
and the potential for carbon removal to undermine carbon
mitigation warrant the establishment of distinct goals within
net zero targets.
1.

The Argument for Equivalence

From a physical science perspective focused narrowly on
atmospheric carbon concentrations, equivalent treatment of
carbon mitigation and carbon removal is logical: “Removing CO2
348. See ANGELA C. JONES & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
IF11455, THE TAX CREDIT FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION (SECTION 45Q) (2021)
(“The tax credit for carbon oxide sequestration—often referred to using its IRC
section, 45Q—is computed per metric ton of qualified carbon oxide captured
and sequestered. (Before 2018, the tax credit was exclusively for CO2.)”).
349. 26 U.S.C. § 45Q(d).
350. See Carlos Anchondo, Trump’s CCS Rule: Details, Doubts and EPA
Disputes, ENERGYWIRE (June 1, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://perma.cc/8L37-RSKD;
Iulia Gheorghiu, IRS Clarifies Carbon Capture Tax Credit, but More Policies
Needed to Drive Deployment, Analysts Say, UTILITY DIVE (June 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/DE3M-QX9H (stating that these new technologies are
exciting but expensive).
351. See Gheorghiu, supra note 350 (stating that some have argued that
the tax credit will better support carbon capturing technologies once they
become commercial).
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from the atmosphere and storing it has the same impact on the
atmosphere climate as simultaneously preventing emission of
an equal amount of CO2.”352
Distinctions commonly drawn between specific techniques
of mitigation or removal sometimes may seem arbitrary.353
Stopping deforestation typically qualifies as mitigation,
whereas afforestation constitutes carbon removal.354 Capturing
and storing carbon from an industrial facility is characterized
as mitigation, whereas capturing and storing carbon from the
air is deemed carbon removal.355 Categorically favoring
mitigation over carbon removal may overlook the uncertainties
and concerns associated with specific techniques.356 For
example, both the cultivation of bioenergy crops (often
characterized as mitigation) and afforestation (a form of carbon
removal) may displace other land uses and make intense
demands on water and other resources.357 Likewise,
CCS—typically classified as mitigation—shares common
challenges of cost and lack of infrastructure with DACS and
BECCS, carbon removal techniques that incorporate CCS.358
And just as efforts to reduce carbon emissions from electricity
generation and industrial production in one place may be
counterbalanced by the relocation of these activities
elsewhere,359 forest conservation at one location may shift
deforestation to other locations.360

352. NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 23.
353. See Gareth Davies, An Emissions Commitment Is a Plan for the
Future: Developing and Using New NETs Should Be at the Heart of That Plan,
in DEBATING CLIMATE LAW (B. Mayer & A. Zahar eds., 2021).
354. See id. at 4.
355. See id. at 4–5.
356. See id. at 7.
357. See MACE ET AL., supra note 62, at 28.
358. See id. at 29.
359. See id. at 31 (stating that “appropriate regulations or safeguards will
need to be put in place”).
360. See G. Cornelis van Kooten & Craig M.T. Johnston, The Economics of
Forest Carbon Offsets, 8 ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 227, 230 (2016) (“[B]ecause
deforestation releases significant amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere, the
preservation and conservation of forests—that is, preventing degradation,
converting to other uses, or simply delaying harvest—have been proposed as
eligible but controversial means to obtain carbon offset credits.”).
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2.

Differences

Carbon removal and carbon mitigation nonetheless differ in
important ways with respect to verifiability, permanence,
readiness, and risks. Some of these differences apply only to
specific techniques, but taken together, these differences
warrant distinct treatment of carbon mitigation and carbon
removal.
a.

Accounting/Verifiability

Existing reporting mechanisms for fossil fuel extraction,
imports, and sales can readily track CO2 emissions from fossil
fuel combustion and reductions in such emissions.361 In contrast,
quantifying carbon benefits from carbon removal generally
poses greater difficulties.362
Carbon accounting for nature-based carbon removal is
particularly challenging. As a general matter, carbon removal
rates depend on complex flows between carbon reservoirs and
change over time.363 Uncertainties and heterogeneity in the
amount of carbon removed have been a significant obstacle to
incorporating forests into the climate regime.364 Climate
conditions, tree species, rates of decomposition, and soil quality
all may affect carbon removal rates.365 Ongoing changes in land
cover compound the uncertainty, as do climate change’s effects
on plant growth and natural disturbances.366 Such uncertainties
361. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 185
(evaluating the existing technologies).
362. See Guy Lomax et al., Reframing the Policy Approach to Greenhouse
Gas Removal Technologies, 78 ENERGY POL’Y 125, 130 (2015) (“[P]ractical
quantification of carbon stored in many [carbon removal] technologies is more
difficult than quantification of carbon emitted by fossil fuel combustion.”).
363. See id.
364. See van der Gaast et al., supra note 318, at 44.
365. See vonHedemann et al., supra note 327, at 11; Gren & Aklilu, supra
note 329, at 129; van der Gaast et al., supra note 318, at 43 (“Forestry projects,
with their relatively long time horizons, have long been considered relatively
risky investments.”); Barbara Haya et al., Managing Uncertainty in Carbon
Offsets: Insights from California’s Standardized Approach, 20 CLIMATE POL’Y
1112, 1122 (2020).
366. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 37, at 28 (pointing out that “the land is
simultaneously a source and sink of CO2, due to a combination of both natural
and anthropogenic factors”).
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are especially large in developing countries, which tend to have
limited measuring and monitoring capacity.367
Soil carbon sequestration also is difficult to quantify and
has likely been overestimated historically because of sampling
bias.368 Changes in soil carbon are small relative to background
carbon levels and often difficult to detect.369 Land management
approaches, soil types, and local climate affect carbon
sequestration rates.370 Experts nonetheless believe that soil
carbon sequestration could be feasibly deployed, at least in parts
of the United States, with remote monitoring and verification
combined with measurements onsite.371
Monitoring and verification are relatively less difficult for
geologically stored carbon, for which methods of tracking
storage and detecting leakage are fairly well-developed.372
DACS is unlikely to pose unmanageable accounting concerns.373
Carbon accounting may prove more challenging for BECCS, as
calculations of net carbon removal must account for induced
land use change as well as variations in production, transport,
conversion, and sequestration.374 Relatively little is known
about the verifiability of carbon stored via mineralization
processes, though scientists suggest that measuring carbon
storage for land-based enhanced weathering may be easier than
for marine-based processes.375
b.

Impermanence

Carbon mitigation and carbon removal must be permanent
to effectively address climate change. Carbon mitigation results
367. See MACE ET AL., supra note 62, at 29.
368. NCI, ACCELERATING NET-ZERO, supra note 2, at 4. Biochar raises
similar concerns regarding measurement and verification. See Fuss et al.,
Negative Emissions, supra note 47, at 26.
369. See ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 37, at 34.
370. See id. at 33.
371. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 12.
372. See id. at 343–44.
373. See id. at 12.
374. See id. at 185 (explaining that “the amount of net carbon removal
largely depends on the specific pathway chosen”); cf. ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note
37, at 41.
375. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 12;
ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 37, at 51–52.
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in avoided emissions, which pose no risk of escape.376 In
contrast, carbon removal techniques are subject to varying risks
of carbon loss.377 Carbon stored in soil or wetlands can escape
upon disturbance.378 Carbon stored in forests can be released by
clearing, fire, or disease.379 Weak land use governance in some
countries may intensify worries about impermanence of
nature-based carbon storage.380
Impermanence is a lesser concern for BECCS, DACS, and
land-based enhanced weathering.381 Storage of carbon in
geologic reservoirs, as in BECCS and DACS, would present a
relatively low risk of significant leakage if properly designed and
implemented, and any leakage theoretically should be
detectable and remediable.382 Although marine enhanced
weathering would store carbon in a dissolved and potentially
impermanent form, enhanced weathering on land would store
carbon in a relatively permanent solid state.383
376. See Kate Dooley & Sivan Kartha, Land-Based Negative Emissions:
Risks for Climate Mitigation and Impacts on Sustainable Development, 18
INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS 79, 85 (2018).
377. See Duncan P. McLaren et al., Beyond “Net-Zero”: A Case for Separate
Targets for Emissions Reduction and Negative Emissions, FRONTIERS IN
CLIMATE, Nov. 2019, at 2 (differentiating between carbon mitigation and
carbon removal).
378. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 11
(“The terrestrial and coastal blue carbon options are reversible if the carbon
sequestering practices are not maintained.”).
379. See id. To address impermanence concerns, carbon markets may
withhold a fraction of offset credits in a buffer pool and nullify those credits if
stored carbon is subsequently released. See id. at 11.
380. See Duncan Brack & Richard King, Managing Land-Based CDR:
BECCS, Forests and Carbon Sequestration, 12 GLOB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 45,
49 (2021).
381. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 12;
Fuss et al., Negative Emissions, supra note 47, at 14 (“In principle, once the
CO2 removed from the atmosphere via BECCS is geologically stored, it is one
of the NET options that is less vulnerable to reversal.”).
382. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at
343– 44 (highlighting the advantages of BECCS and DACS); MACE ET AL.,
supra note 62, at 30.
383. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 12
(“CO2 that is geologically sequestered can leak from saline aquifers but at rates
low and straightforward enough to remediate.”); Fuss et al., Negative
Emissions, supra note 47, at 23 (“Hence these methods are connected and
other land-based NETs could rely on EW to create the optimal soil and
nutrient supply conditions.”).
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The need to store carbon for centuries or longer further
complicates the enforceability of carbon storage obligations.384
In the mitigation context, an entity that emits excessive GHGs
can be penalized and required to make up for its excess
emissions. Enforcing an entity’s commitment to store emissions
for centuries is trickier. Possible mechanisms to incentivize
follow-through on such commitments include withholding
carbon credits or awarding them over time, but these
mechanisms would reduce the value of credits and the
attractiveness of carbon storage projects.385
c.

Technological Maturity and Feasibility

Although some carbon mitigation technologies, such as
energy storage and net zero carbon fuels, require further
research and development,386 many carbon mitigation options,
including renewable energy generation and energy efficient
technologies, are technologically mature and economically
feasible.387
Carbon removal technologies also reflect a range of
maturities and costs. However, scenarios for achieving Paris’s
temperature goals rely most heavily on carbon removal
technologies that are less mature and involve greater
uncertainties.388 Relatively cheap techniques that are already
being deployed, such as afforestation and soil carbon
sequestration, offer only limited carbon storage capacity.389
Carbon removal techniques that promise greater storage
384. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 42
(concluding that “carbon needs to be stored, on average, for millennia” because
of its long residence time in the atmosphere and oceans).
385. See NCI, ACCELERATING NET-ZERO, supra note 2, at 4. Indeed,
contracts to create forest carbon offsets not only involve long-term
commitments that are difficult to enforce, but also are subject to
principal-agent problems that can undermine the integrity of the offsets. See
van Kooten, supra note 43, at 85–86.
386. See NAS, ACCELERATING DECARBONIZATION, supra note 27, at 57–58.
387. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text.
388. See Dooley & Kartha, supra note 376, at 82.
389. See Minx et al., supra note 37, at 17 (“NETs are, in principle, feasible
at variable costs and with at least partially proven technology but not at
unlimited scale, and often with high uncertainties on impact.”); Dooley &
Kartha, supra note 376, at 84 (differentiating between various carbon removal
techniques).
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potential—BECCS and DACS—are more expensive and less
mature, featuring in a small handful of demonstration
projects.390 BECCS has yet to achieve commercial viability,391
and DACS has “arrived at the ‘valley of death,’ where new
technologies often fail to commercialize due to lack of
investment.”392 Expanded government funding and policy
support is necessary to enable commercialization and to
stimulate demand for these technologies.393
Relatedly, the costs of carbon removal vary widely among
techniques and are subject to change and uncertainty.
Land-based carbon removal is generally less expensive, but
costs vary depending on practice and region.394 DACS, which can
currently remove carbon at an estimated cost of $600 per ton, is
not yet economically feasible.395 However, some estimates
project that costs could fall below $150 or $100 per ton with
further development.396 BECCS’s costs are partially offset by the
production of electricity, but the relative inefficiency of

390. See Minx et al., supra note 37, at 17 (emphasizing the importance of
discussing a “variety of technologies contributing potentially at more modest
scales”).
391. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 149
(“Biomass-fueled power generation is commercially deployed across the United
States and the world, although no biomass power plants are coupled with
carbon capture and sequestration.”); cf. id. at 8 (concluding that BECCS is
“ready for large-scale deployment” under the assumption that geological
sequestration is ready for large-scale deployment).
392. LARSEN ET AL., supra note 340, at 20.
393. See id. at 5–6, 20–21 (stating that federal action is needed to “[p]ush
and [p]ull DAC [i]nto the [m]arketplace”); NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 232–46 (listing barriers that need to be
overcome for effective assessment and deployment of direct air capture
technology).
394. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 120
(“The direct costs of establishing new forests and performing management
activities in different regions are well known based on experience, and several
studies have revealed how landowners would respond to various carbon price
levels.”).
395. Id. at 125.
396. See FRIEDMANN ET AL., supra note 13, at 22; PIOTROWSKI & LANGLEY,
supra note 49, at 11–12 (citing NAS study); see also LARSEN ET AL., supra note
340, at 20 (estimating a levelized cost of $124 to $325 per metric ton of CO2
removed from the atmosphere for the first state-of-the-art, megaton scale DAC
plant, plus $18 per metric ton of CO2 stored).
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bioenergy facilities leaves these facilities at a marked cost
disadvantage to other sources of electric power.397
d.

Risks

Different techniques of carbon mitigation and carbon
removal involve a range of drawbacks. However, greater
uncertainty may surround the effects and risks of carbon
removal technologies because they are generally less developed.
The following discussion sketches out some of the more
prominent concerns associated with carbon removal
techniques.398
BECCS and land-based carbon removal techniques require
significant amounts of land and could harm the livelihoods, food
production, and biodiversity of local communities.399 This is of
particular concern where land is converted to a new use.400
Forestry activities and cultivation of bioenergy crops could
increase competition for land, water, and fertilizer while
exacerbating polluted runoff and other ecological impacts.401

397. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 163
(“The primary challenge for biomass electrical power with carbon capture and
sequestration is the low efficiency (typically less than 25 percent) of biomass
power plants.”).
398. Note that some carbon removal technologies may offer co-benefits.
BECCS produces energy or biofuels. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 43 (explaining that a potential co-benefit of
creating billions of tons of negative CO2 emissions includes “electricity
generation or biofuel production for BECCS”). Soil carbon sequestration,
afforestation, biochar, and terrestrial enhanced weathering can improve soil
quality. See id. at 123; Fuss et al., Negative Emissions, supra note 47, at 33
(noting the varying costs of different technologies).
399. See IPCC, supra note 19, at 125 (highlighting the drawbacks of
BECCS and other carbon removal techniques); Dooley & Kartha, supra note
376, at 84–85 (pointing out that large-scale deployment of NETs likely involves
less than desirable ecological and social impacts).
400. See Fuss et al., Negative Emissions, supra note 47, at 13 (“Climate
effects belong to the categories of direct land use change, indirect land use
change, and albedo effects. Land use change emissions include those from
change in previous use, such as deforestation, and changes in global land use
induced by economic markets.”).
401. See id. at 13, 16 (listing the negative impacts of forestry activities);
NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 165–67 (“The area
of land required per unit mass of carbon removed from the atmosphere is
particularly important for BECCS, leading to different potential impacts
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Increased forest cover could also contribute to further warming
by reducing the reflection of solar radiation.402
Compared to other types of carbon removal, DACS has a
smaller physical footprint and offers greater geographical
flexibility.403 Air capture facilities in theory could be located
anywhere, but energy, infrastructure, and water needs will
influence their location.404 DACS’s large energy requirements
are a major factor contributing to its high costs.405 In addition,
the geological carbon storage involved in DACS and BECCS may
trigger risks of groundwater contamination, seismic activity,
and leaks from over-pressurization.406
Enhanced weathering is surrounded by scientific, economic,
and environmental unknowns.407 Extracting and transporting
minerals would impact the environment, and applying them
could alter soil or ocean chemistry.408 In some contexts, mineral
regarding land-use change, land conservation (e.g., nutrient availability), and
biodiversity.”).
402. See Fuss et al., Negative Emissions, supra note 47, at 16 (stating the
biophysical, social, and economic side effects); Geden & Schenuit, supra note
25, at 10 (identifying “reduced reflection of solar radiation (albedo) in forest
areas at northern latitudes” as a side effect of afforestation).
403. See Christoph Beuttler et al., The Role of Direct Air Capture in
Mitigation of Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Emissions, FRONTIERS IN
CLIMATE, Nov. 2019, at 4 (reporting estimate by Climeworks, a leading DACS
developer, that removing one gigaton of CO2 would require 2000 km2 of land,
including land required for renewable energy production).
404. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 224
(“Direct air capture systems have significantly fewer land requirements than
do afforestation/reforestation and BECCS approaches, and because they do not
require arable land their impacts on biodiversity would be much smaller.”).
405. See Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 11 (“The potential of this
method is limited by the large amounts of energy it requires . . . .”); NAS,
NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 376–78 (providing a
table with costs).
406. See Fuss et al., Negative Emissions, supra note 47, at 14, 19
(highlighting global sequestration potential and costs); NAS, NEGATIVE
EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 337–38, 346 (explaining that
induced seismic events have increased over the past five years “in regions with
historically low rates of seismicity”).
407. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 8
(“Carbon mineralization is currently constrained by many scientific
unknowns, as well as uncertainty about environmental impacts and likely
cost.”).
408. See Fuss et al., Negative Emissions, supra note 47, at 22 (pointing out
side effects associated with extraction and transportation of minerals); IPCC,
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application might yield co-benefits of improved soil quality or
reduced ocean acidification.409 In situ carbon mineralization
(where carbon would be immobilized through subsurface
reactions) might avoid some adverse impacts but the technique
at this point remains “largely speculative” and might cause
water contamination or increased seismicity.410
Just as some mitigation measures may be more acceptable
to the public than others, different types of carbon removal will
face varying levels of public acceptance.411 Techniques that
involve modifications to existing practices, such as improved
forest management or soil carbon sequestration, may encounter
less public opposition.412 In contrast, techniques requiring land
conversion could encounter resistance because of effects on land
tenure, local livelihoods, food security, and gender equity.413
Furthermore, concerns surrounding risks of geological storage
could drive public opposition to DACS or BECCS projects.414
3.

Mitigation Deterrence

Net zero strategies that fail to distinguish carbon removal
and carbon mitigation assume their equivalence. Carbon
markets that award credits equally for carbon removal and
carbon mitigation rest on the same assumption. However,
policymaking based on that assumption can undermine

supra note 19, at 345–46 (explaining that ocean chemistry includes oxygen
content and ocean acidification).
409. See Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 11 (noting that mineral
application “could contribute to improving soil quality” and “could counteract
increasing [ocean] acidification”).
410. NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 273,
302– 03.
411. See Gregory F. Nemet et al., Negative Emissions—Part 3: Innovation
and Upscaling, ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 063003, May 2018, at 8 (“While often
treated as a separate issue, public acceptance of new technologies is crucial to
their widespread adoption.”).
412. See id.
413. See Holly Jean Buck, Rapid Scale-Up of Negative Emissions
Technologies: Social Barriers and Social Implications, 139 CLIMATIC CHANGE
155, 159–65 (2016) (identifying social areas that need to be confronted to scale
up negative emissions technologies and suggesting recommendations for
scientists, entrepreneurs, and policymakers).
414. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 347.
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mitigation efforts.415 In the course of implementing net zero, the
danger, or moral hazard, is that key actors might substitute
carbon removal for carbon mitigation.416
Such substitution may be problematic if: (1) carbon removed
is not equivalent to carbon mitigated; (2) substitution shifts the
burden of climate action to different people or future
generations; or (3) both carbon removal and carbon mitigation
are essential. Each of these conditions is a cause for serious
concern.
a.

Non-Equivalence

Substituting carbon removal for emissions reductions could
promote a more cost-effective response to climate change.417
Under cap-and-trade regimes allowing for the direct
interchangeability of carbon mitigated and carbon removed,
entities could simply choose between reducing emissions
directly or purchasing carbon credits generated by mitigation or
carbon removal activities.418 Regulated entities would have an
economic incentive to choose the cheapest option and, if carbon
mitigated and carbon removed were fungible, the same social
benefit of limiting atmospheric carbon could be achieved at a
lower cost.
Thus far, however, the cap-and-trade regimes that
incorporate carbon removal generally have adopted conditions
that acknowledge fundamental differences between carbon
removal and mitigation. California established a ceiling on
entities’ ability to rely on offsets—including forestry offsets—to
satisfy their compliance obligations. Australia’s Carbon
Farming Initiative capped industry’s ability to rely on
sequestered carbon to satisfy carbon tax requirements. And the
European Union’s refusal to accept carbon credits from CDM
415. See Kevin Anderson & Glen Peters, The Trouble with Negative
Emissions, 354 SCIENCE 182, 183 (2016) (pointing out that negative-emission
technologies exist at different levels of development); Geden et al., supra note
9, at 490 (explaining how the EU has been dealing with implementation of net
zero policy).
416. See McLaren et al., supra note 377, at 1–2; Alexandre C. Köberle, The
Value of BECCS in IAMs: A Review, 6 CURRENT SUSTAINABLE/RENEWABLE
ENERGY REP. 107, 108 (2019).
417. See Köberle, supra note 416, at 107.
418. See Gren & Aklilu, supra note 329, at 128.
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forestry projects reflects skepticism regarding whether these
credits represent carbon benefits equivalent to those generated
by emissions reductions.419
One fundamental difference between carbon mitigation and
carbon removal involves lost opportunity: “emissions reductions
foregone in the present cannot be substituted in the global
cumulative carbon budget by future emissions reductions.”420 In
other words, a decision to emit carbon today is not reversible,
although it can be countered by increasing reliance on carbon
removal.421 Another important distinction involves permanence:
avoided emissions pose no risk of escape, whereas carbon
removal poses varying risks of carbon loss, depending on the
specific technique.422 Moreover, carbon mitigation technologies
generally are more mature and involve less uncertainty than
carbon removal techniques.423 Those carbon removal techniques
that
are
mature—afforestation
and
soil
carbon
sequestration—are subject to the greatest risk of carbon loss.424
And those techniques that promise greater permanence—DACS
and BECCS—are less mature.425 When technological maturity

419. See
Use
of
International
Credits,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://perma.cc/PU4Z-DAP2 (precluding use of Clean Development
Mechanism credits from afforestation or reforestation activities); see also
Wilfried Rickels et al., The Future of (Negative) Emissions Trading in the
European Union 9 (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper No. 2164,
2020) (citing Article 12(3a) of the ETS Directive). EU emissions trading rules
do provide that emitting facilities need not surrender emission allowances for
carbon emissions that are captured and stored. Id.
420. McLaren et al., supra note 377, at 2.
421. Id.
422. See supra Part IV.B.2.
423. See James Temple, Carbon Removal Hype Is Becoming a Dangerous
Distraction, MIT TECH. REV. (July 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/7554-YYLA
(explaining that there is significant uncertainty about the viability and
effectiveness of large-scale carbon removal strategies and technologies).
424. See Dooley & Kartha, supra note 376, at 85 (“Negative emissions
options that rely on sequestering carbon into the terrestrial biosphere
inherently entail a risk that those carbon stocks will be re-released to the
atmosphere.”).
425. See Brack & King, supra note 380, 47–50 (2020) (explaining that
“BECCS remains a fledgling technology” while nature-based carbon removal
techniques “can be deployed in the near term, at low cost, and are attainable
from approaches that are already available, rather than being reliant on
largely unproven technologies”).
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and storage permanence are both considered, carbon mitigation
techniques are preferable to carbon removal.426
Substitution of carbon removal for carbon mitigation also
raises less obvious but equally important systemic concerns.
Namely, such substitution might “delay[] transformative
changes, lock[] in fossil fuel use, maintain[] the political power
of fossil-heavy interests, and thus institutionaliz[e] the
circumstances in which accelerated emissions cuts continue to
be politically and economically expensive.”427 Carbon mitigation
efforts today might facilitate future mitigation by building
economies of scale and reducing marginal costs, whereas carbon
removal might prevent or delay these benefits.428
b.

Burden Shifting

A further danger of substituting carbon removal for carbon
mitigation is the potential to shift the burdens of climate
action—and risks of inaction—to vulnerable peoples or future
generations. In climate change negotiations, developing
countries have long resented being asked to preserve tropical
forests in order to make up for developed countries’ carbon
emissions.429 Similar concerns that the Global South might bear

426. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 14
(“There are also ongoing risks of reversals and losses from carbon stored in
land-based and geologic pools that could negate the climate benefit of carbon
removals.”).
427. See McLaren et al., supra note 377, at 4; see Habiba Ahut Daggash &
Niall Mac Dowell, Higher Carbon Prices on Emissions Alone Will Not Deliver
the Paris Agreement, 3 JOULE 2120, 2132 (2019) (reporting modeling results
indicating that early carbon removal may prolong reliance on fossil fuel-fired
power plants).
428. See Kenneth Gillingham & James H. Stock, The Cost of Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 53, 63 (2018); Tabea Dorndorf
et al., Carbon Removal Experts Support Splitting “Net Zero” into Twin Targets,
CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Nov. 5, 2021, 5:04 PM), https://perma.cc/P4EW-PJX7.
429. See Peter Healey et al., Governing Net Zero Carbon Removals to Avoid
Entrenching Inequities, FRONTIERS IN CLIMATE, May 2021, at 4 (“CDRs are seen
as the rich country escape route from assuming a historically fair share of
gross emissions reductions. . . . [I]n the developing world, unconditionally
fungible ‘net zero’ emission framings need to be replaced or circumscribed so
as to address and mitigate such perceptions.”).
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disproportionate burdens surround the net zero concept.430 In
particular, carbon removal activities might impact food
production, land use, biodiversity, and local livelihoods in these
countries.431 Moreover, should carbon removal efforts fall short,
disadvantaged communities and the Global South will suffer the
most severe climate consequences.432
Substituting carbon removal for carbon mitigation may also
shift the timeframe in which climate action occurs. Carbon
removal via afforestation and other nature-based techniques
occurs over decades.433 Land conversion activities, such as forest
or habitat destruction, can generate an initial carbon debt and
delay carbon removal benefits.434 More troublingly, carbon
removal is sometimes framed as a tool to compensate in the
future for present-day carbon emissions.435 The application of
discount rates in economic modeling can make future carbon
removal seem more attractive than deep decarbonization
today.436 Yet forgoing emissions reductions now in favor of
removing carbon later shifts responsibility for addressing the
climate crisis to future generations.437 It also transfers to future
generations the risks that such technologies might fail or have
unacceptable costs.438 If these technologies prove infeasible or
430. See Megan Darby, Net Zero: The Story of the Target that Will Shape
Our Future, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (Sept. 16, 2019, 5:30 AM),
https://perma.cc/BSB3-AYRL.
431. See Dooley & Kartha, supra note 376, at 92.
432. See Anderson & Peters, supra note 415, at 183.
433. See Rene Cho, Net Zero Pledges: Can They Get Us Where We Need to
Go?, COLUM. CLIMATE SCH. (Dec. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/5KEX-ECFF.
434. See Mathilde Fajardy et al., Negative Emissions: Priorities for
Research and Policy Design, FRONTIERS IN CLIMATE, Oct. 2019, at 3.
435. See Dooley & Kartha, supra note 376, at 81.
436. See Anderson & Peters, supra note 415, at 183.
437. Köberle, supra note 416, at 109. This point is underscored by the
pivotal role of the discount rate used in Integrated Assessment Modeling
scenarios: carbon removal is projected to assume an increasingly significant
role as modelers apply a higher discount rate. Id. In other words, the
application of a high discount rate can make future investments in carbon
removal appear unrealistically cheap in comparison to present-day mitigation.
Id.
438. See Henry Shue, Climate Dreaming: Negative Emissions, Risk
Transfer, and Irreversibility, 8 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T, 203, 208 (2017)
[I]t is unjust to create a gamble in which, if it goes badly, the losers
are people who are totally vulnerable to us, the poorer people of the
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ineffective, there is no backstop alternative and no way to undo
emissions already released.439 The failure of carbon removal
techniques to live up to expectations could leave humanity
“stranded with an insufficiently transformed energy economy
and a carbon debt that cannot be repaid.” 440
c.

Both Essential

Indeed, not only might carbon removal be framed as a
substitute for emissions reductions, but it might actually
displace or deter mitigation efforts.441 Such deterrence would
harm the prospects of achieving Paris’s climate goals. Achieving
those goals requires both drastic reductions in emissions and a
dramatic ramp-up of carbon removal.442 As a National Academy
of Sciences committee concluded, both a “massive deployment of
low-carbon technologies” to reduce energy-related carbon
emissions, as well as a rapid scale-up of carbon removal
technologies that assumes uncertain research breakthroughs,
are necessary.443 Substituting carbon removal for carbon
reduction does little good if both are essential.444
C.

Net Zero Pledges Should Incorporate Distinct Targets for
Carbon Mitigation and Carbon Removal

In light of important differences between carbon mitigation
and carbon removal and the danger of mitigation deterrence, net
zero policies should distinguish between carbon mitigation and
future whose food supply we are gambling with, and, if it goes well,
the winners are ourselves, the well-off of the present who might
otherwise invest more heavily in ambitious mitigation now.
439. See Dooley & Kartha, supra note 376, at 81.
440. Id. at 95.
441. See McLaren et al., supra note 377, at 1–2.
442. See NAS, NEGATIVE EMISSIONS TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 35, at 1, 9.
443. See id.; see also Honegger & Reiner, supra note 35, at 308
(characterizing the scale of carbon removal necessary as “mindboggling”);
Beuttler et al., supra note 403, at 1 (noting that vast majority of modeling
pathways for achieving 2°C goal rely on large-scale carbon removal as well as
mitigation).
444. See McLaren et al., supra note 377, at 1 (“[S]ubstituting negative
emissions for emissions reduction could be harmful in itself. . . . It is crucial to
ensure that negative emissions are delivered in addition to rapid emissions
reduction.”).
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carbon removal.445 Indeed, just as net zero goals may be adopted
internationally, nationally, sub-nationally, or by a single
organization, distinct targets for carbon removal and emission
reductions should be adopted at different levels as well.446
Net zero goals potentially obscure reliance on carbon
removal and promote a narrow focus on costs.447 All other things
being equal, the economically rational way to implement a net
zero commitment is to choose the most cost-effective
option—i.e., the combination of carbon mitigation and carbon
removal that fulfills that commitment at the lowest cost.448
Various nations and companies have expressed an intent to
achieve net zero by relying on forestry and other land-based
carbon removal approaches, notwithstanding concerns of
verifiability and impermanence.449 This development is
unsurprising, as the enhancement of natural carbon sinks
typically has been viewed as a cheap source of carbon credits.450
Yet net zero commitments that rely on DACS and BECCS raise
concerns as well should these less mature techniques fail to
develop as anticipated.451 The uncertain and changing nature of
carbon removal costs further complicates calculations regarding
the optimal blend of emissions mitigation and carbon removal.
1.

Distinct Targets Within Net Zero Pledges

As an initial matter, net zero targets—whether set by
nations, corporations, or other entities—should include distinct
targets for emissions reduction and carbon removal.452 Clearly

445. See id. at 2.
446. See id.
447. See Dorndorf et al., supra note 428.
448. See Cho, supra note 433.
449. See Temple, supra note 423.
450. See Gren & Aklilu, supra note 329, at 128.
451. See Levin et al., Designing and Communicating, supra note 4, at 14
(noting a “large degree of uncertainty about the scale and availability of future
carbon removals from both land-based carbon sinks and emerging
carbon-removal technologies”).
452. This recommendation goes beyond other approaches that focus on
distinct national or international targets, e.g., Geden & Schenuit, supra note
25, or that call for a sector-based approach, e.g., Yoichi Kaya et al., Toward
Net Zero CO2 Emissions Without Relying on Massive Carbon Dioxide Removal,
14 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 1739 (2019).
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distinguishing the two can “safeguard the primacy of
conventional mitigation measures and . . . communicate them
visibly,” thereby reducing the danger that the prospect of future
carbon removal might undermine present mitigation.453 Climate
policy should strive to address climate change through ongoing
action rather than shifting the burden of responding to future
generations.454
Distinct targets would also limit the temptation to rely on
present-day carbon removal to substitute for emissions
reductions.455 Some reliance on carbon removal to achieve net
zero goals is inevitable because certain GHG emissions will be
too difficult to eliminate.456 However, the urgency of the climate
crisis points toward minimizing tradeoffs of carbon mitigation
against carbon removal.457 Both mitigation and carbon removal
are essential, and setting distinct targets for each limits the risk
that success in one area would weaken efforts in the other.458
Unexpected progress on carbon removal could even enable net
zero emissions—or even net negative emissions—to be achieved
earlier than planned.459
Setting distinct targets for mitigation and carbon removal
can also counter the tendency for market and regulatory
453. See Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 6, 32; Levin et al., Designing
and Communicating, supra note 4, at 3 (“Distinct targets provide a clear road
map for decarbonization, scaling carbon removals, and achieving net-zero or
net-negative emissions.”).
454. See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
455. See Rickels et al., supra note 419, at 11 (recommending against fully
integrating carbon removal into emissions trading systems because it would
favor the use of low-cost techniques).
456. See Healey et al., supra note 429, at 2 (“The IPCC 1.5° Report makes
clear that offsetting residual emissions is one role of CDR . . . .”).
457. See Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 7 (“[T]he conventional
mitigation approach, which is aimed at avoiding emissions, has lost nothing of
its urgency—quite the contrary. However, to achieve the global climate targets
adopted by the UNFCCC, unconventional mitigation methods involving the
deliberate removal of CO2 from the atmosphere must also be used.”).
458. See Cho, supra note 433 (critiquing net-zero pledges as potentially
meaningless, because the pledges necessarily depend on carbon offsets,
including credits and nature-based removal, which allow companies to avoid
the ‘hard work’ of mitigation).
459. See Geden & Schenuit, supra note 25, at 6 (“[B]reakthroughs in CO2
removal methods would not lead to a decrease in emission reductions, but to
net zero or net negative emissions being achieved earlier.”); cf. Geden et al.,
supra note 9, at 492.

MAKING NET ZERO MATTER

761

uncertainty to undermine investment in projects or technologies
with long planning horizons.460 DACS and BECCS offer greater
removal potential and permanence than other carbon removal
techniques but are not yet cost competitive.461 Specific targets
for DACS or BECCS—in addition to targets for overall carbon
removal—can encourage investment to drive down costs and
address potential risks.462
Setting distinct targets for mitigation and carbon removal
has a historical precedent in EU climate policy.463 Under EU
policy from 2013 to 2020, negative emissions from land use
changes were reported separately and were not counted toward
the target of reducing emissions 20 percent by 2020.464 Between
2021 and 2030, net carbon removals from the LULUCF (land
use, land use-changes, and forests) sector may be counted only
in limited quantities toward emission reduction targets.465 In

460. See ELKIND ET AL., supra note 49, at 11 (“Uncertainty about the state’s
long-term vision for engineered carbon removal can create lackluster project
investment, especially for projects with long planning horizons that need
certainty for years, if not decades, into the future.”).
461. See Siddartha Ramakanth Keshavadasu, Why We Must Ponder on
Carbon Capture Technology to Reduce GHG Emissions, DOWN TO EARTH (Oct.
18, 2021), https://perma.cc/7B65-53P2 (stating that carbon capture and
storage is one of the most effective ways of reducing carbon in the atmosphere,
but the current cost is approximately $900–$1,000 per ton).
462. See Lars Zetterberg et al., Incentivizing BECCS—A Swedish Case
Study, FRONTIERS IN CLIMATE, Aug. 2021, at 1, 6 (“Long-term agreements in
which the government undertakes to buy a large volume of negative emissions
from one or more suppliers through auctions have the possible advantage that
the price can be pressed downwards.”).
463. See The European Parliament and of the Council Decision No.
529/2013/EU of 21 May 2013, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 165) 83 (describing
accounting rules established by decision “as a first step towards the inclusion
of those activities in the Union’s emission reduction commitment, when
appropriate”).
464. Id. at 80; see Annalisa Savaresi et al., Making Sense of the LULUCF
Regulation: Much Ado About Nothing?, 29 REV. EUROPEAN, COMPAR. & INT’L
ENV’T L. 212, 212–13 (2020) (explaining that LULUCF activities were excluded
because they have been viewed as difficult to regulate and to measure).
465. See The European Parliament and of the Council Regulation No.
2018/842 of 9 July 2018, art. 7, 2018 O.J. (L 156) 26 (explaining what kind of
accounting categories may be taken into account for compliance when a
Member State’s emissions exceed allocation for the year). Targeted reductions
would reduce energy and industrial emissions by 30 percent and overall
emissions by 40 percent. Id. at art. 2. The role of LULUCF is likely to grow
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addition, a separate regulation establishes a specific target for
the LULUCF sector and requires member states to ensure that
LULUCF emissions do not exceed removals.466 EU reluctance to
fully integrate LULUCF carbon removals into its climate
mitigation scheme reflects concerns about the uncertainty and
impermanence of land-based carbon storage, as well as the
potential for mitigation deterrence.467
2.

Sectoral Targets

Distinct targets for carbon mitigation and carbon removal
also should be set within specific sectors. Indeed, a 2021
National Academy of Sciences report recommends the
establishment of a GHG emissions budget “that goes to net-zero
in 2050 and that establishes separate sectoral benchmarks for
net CO2 emissions from all sectors (industry, buildings,
transportation, electricity, agricultural operations, net
emissions from bio-energy with carbon capture and
sequestration, and negative emissions from direct air capture,
mineralization, forestry and agricultural soils).”468
Setting distinct targets for individual sectors of the
economy can provide stronger incentives for actions that
contribute to achieving net zero on a global scale.469 Focusing on
with the E.U. slated to reduce its emissions even further by 2030. Savaresi et
al., supra note 464, at 218–19.
466. See The European Parliament and of the Council Regulation No.
2018/841 of 30 May 2018, art. 4, 2018 O.J. (L 156) 32 (explaining that member
states must limit their greenhouse gas emissions according to a linear
trajectory that is five-twelfths of the distance from 2019 to 2020 or in 2020
according to what is lower); HANNES BÖTTCHER ET AL., EU LULUCF
REGULATION EXPLAINED: SUMMARY OF CORE PROVISIONS AND EXPECTED EFFECTS
8 (2019) (“For the first time, the LULUCF Regulation establishes a target for
this sector in EU law. . . . The LULUCF Regulation introduces the obligation
for Member States to ensure that emissions do not exceed removals from land
use, land use-changes and forests.”).
467. See Rickels et al., supra note 419, at 10 (“The reason for such likely
exclusion relates to the often uncertain or impermanent storage of CO2 that
would make it hard to equate one ton of avoided fossil emissions with one ton
of removed (biogenic) emissions.”).
468. NAS, ACCELERATING DECARBONIZATION, supra note 27, at 183.
469.
See Noa Hoffman, Exclusive: Government Set to Announce Ambitious
Carbon Emission Reduction Target for Power Sector By 2035, POLITICSHOME
(Oct. 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/3K9D-GTVB; Kaya et al., supra note 452, at
1742–43.
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key GHG-emitting sectors and identifying concrete pathways for
achieving net zero within each sector will reduce reliance on
problematic assumptions about the feasibility of carbon removal
strategies.470 Unable to shift responsibility for reducing
emissions or removing carbon to sources in other sectors, each
sector will be encouraged to develop and implement techniques
for reducing its own emissions or removing carbon.471 The
inability to access cheaper emissions reductions from a different
sector does mean that a sector-based approach could involve
higher costs.472 Sectoral targets nonetheless can ease individual
company concerns that decarbonization efforts will put them at
a competitive disadvantage.473
3.

Policy Incentives

Even if governments set sectoral targets, they would also
have to decide on policies to achieve those targets.474 With
respect to mitigation, policymakers have a wide range of tools to
incentivize decarbonization and energy efficiency—mandates,
taxes, subsidies, cap-and-trade systems, renewable portfolio
standards, etc.475 Policies could promote both mitigation and
carbon removal. For example, emitters could be required to
balance out their emissions by directly or indirectly removing an

470. See Kaya et al., supra note 452, at 1740 (advocating shift from a global
examination to a country-specific and sector-specific examination of how to
achieve net zero to make the goal more manageable).
471. See David Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive
Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive
Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 334 (1998).
472. See WEF, supra note 66, at 18 (“In most sectors, full decarbonization
would require implementing even costlier measures. Especially in
hard-to-abate industry and transport sectors, moving to net-zero emissions
will require the use of technologies that are not yet mature and are therefore
very expensive.”).
473. See id. at 33.
474. See Kaya et al., supra note 452, at 1740 (recommending continued
policy maker involvement in encouraging continued research and development
and updating roadmaps toward net zero emissions).
475. See id. at 1739 (“[I]n addition to economic incentives and other policy
measures, [a policy guideline called ‘Net Zero CO2 emissions without relying
on massive CDR’] would help to overcome the often simplistic demands for
positive modelling results and refocus climate policy on tackling the enormous
barriers in key emitting sectors.”).
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equal amount of carbon from the atmosphere.476 An emissions
tax or liability regime could require emitters to pay for carbon
removal.477 And policies may focus specifically on incentivizing
the development of specific types of carbon removal or
ameliorating their adverse effects.478
Whether distinct targets should be set for different types of
carbon removal technologies poses a more difficult question. The
variability and projected changes in costs and maturity among
techniques has led to a suggestion to phase in these techniques,
starting with less costly ones and then introducing others as
further development lowers their costs.479 Addressing the issue
will require policy choices that account for each technology’s
prospects, potential significance, and risks.480 In other words,
governments might have to engage in the difficult task of
picking technology winners.481 Nonetheless, reasonable policies
at this juncture should set an overall carbon removal target and
476. See Myles R. Allen et al., The Case for Mandatory Sequestration, 2
NATURE GEOSCIENCE 813, 814 (2009) (suggesting that the sale and use of fossil
carbon only be allowed if “an adequate fraction of its carbon content has been
permanently sequestered,” where adequate fraction is “the ratio between
cumulative emissions from the time the policy is fully adopted to total
outstanding allowable emissions at that time”); Tracy Hester, Legal Pathways
to Negative Emissions Technologies and Direct Air Capture of Greenhouse
Gases, 48 ENV’T L. REP. 10413, 10431 (2018) (suggesting that regulators should
consider allowing facilities to offset their CO2 emissions in one location with
their CO2 removals in another area).
477. See Sabine Fuss et al., Moving Toward Net-Zero Emissions Requires
New Alliances for Carbon Dioxide Removal, 3 ONE EARTH 145, 148 (2020)
[hereinafter Fuss et al., Moving Toward Net-Zero] (noting proposal to require
emitters to pay for removal of the CO2 they emit, in order to incentivize CDR
deployment); MACE ET AL., supra note 62, at 31 (noting that there must be a
framework of liability in place to provide for redress for any net reversal of
storage).
478. See Rickels et al., supra note 419, at 6 (suggesting the award of
additional carbon credits for carbon removal or the imposition of a floor
requiring use of a minimum amount of carbon credits derived from carbon
removal).
479. See Fuss et al., Moving Toward Net-Zero, supra note 477, at 147.
480. See Sergey Paltsev, Managing Uncertainty While Developing
Long-Term Strategies for GHG Emission Mitigation, WORLD RES. INST.,
https://perma.cc/89N2-4KZ2.
481. See Gary E. Marchant, Sustainable Energy Technologies: Ten Lessons
from the History of Technology Regulation, 18 WIDENER L.J. 831, 836 (2009)
(stating that it is very difficult to determine in advance which energy
technologies will succeed).
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actively support a range of carbon removal technologies.482
Otherwise, the techniques that are presently the cheapest to
deploy are likely to proliferate despite their limitations, and
currently more expensive techniques may languish
notwithstanding their greater long-term potential.483 Policy
support for a diverse portfolio of carbon removal techniques
partially postpones the need to pick winners until more
information is available regarding their relative merits.484 At
the same time, offering stronger support for techniques that
promise more permanent carbon removal appropriately
recognizes their greater value in combating climate change.485
Targets alone will not suffice to yield carbon removal on a
scale sufficient to achieve net zero.486 Financial support for
research and development, such as the $447 million earmarked
for carbon removal research by the December 2020 economic
stimulus package, is one important step.487 The same legislation
also created a task force to study the amount of carbon removal
needed to achieve net zero by 2050, evaluate different carbon
482. See Paltsev, supra note 480 (“[U]ncertainty about future costs and
technologies should discourage governments from trying to pick the ‘winners’;
instead, their policy and investment focus should be on targeting emissions
reductions from any energy source.”).
483. See Rickels et al., supra note 419, at 11 (“Fully integrating NETs into
the EU ETS at this stage would be an incentive to prioritize the use of low-cost
NETs . . . . This would not only come at the expense of conventional emission
reductions but also impede NETs with higher investment costs . . . .”).
484. See Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal, supra note 43, at 571–72 (arguing
that support for carbon removal research can facilitate learning and guide
choices among carbon removal technologies).
485. See Joppa et al., supra note 104, 632 (lamenting the lack of a
consistent standard for monetarily accounting for the duration of carbon
storage or the potential for premature release).
486. See ECIU, supra note 25, at 5 (“[A] target is just a target—without
policies to cut emissions progressively towards that target, there is a
substantial chance that it will not be achieved . . . .”).
487. See Bobby Magill, Stimulus Law Program to Scrub Carbon from Air
Draws Skeptics, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/4TVZ-LFFB
(reporting on passage of stimulus bill designating $447 million for carbon
removal). The research program aims “to test, validate, or improve
technologies and strategies to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere on
a large scale.” Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong.
§ 969D(a) (enacted). The legislation defines carbon removal to include DACS,
enhanced carbon mineralization, BECCS, forest restoration, soil carbon
management, and direct ocean capture, § 5002(a), but singles out DACS for
particular support through prize competitions and other means, § 5001.
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removal approaches, and make policy recommendations.488
Policies to encourage deployment of mature carbon removal
technologies might include carbon credits or tax benefits for
reforestation and agricultural practices that enhance soil carbon
storage.489 Policies to support engineered carbon removal might
establish clear strategies that foster certainty for developers
and other actors, coordinate permitting processes, identify
potential geological sites and corridors, and extend or expand
existing tax credits.490
CONCLUSION
Achieving net zero on a global scale is essential if we are to
flatten the curve on climate change. Net zero pledges by nations
and corporations can play a pivotal role in the battle against
climate change but must constitute more than vague promises.
Concrete goals and deadlines can promote accountability, as can
transparency on emissions, mitigation measures, and reliance
on offsets and carbon removal. In setting net zero targets,
entities should spell out emissions pathways leading to net zero,
as pathway specifics directly shape the remaining carbon budget
and the probability of achieving the Paris temperature goals.
Interim targets can assist actors to develop and revise effective
strategies for implementing net zero, build confidence among
stakeholders regarding future conditions and expectations, and
enable observers to understand target ambitions and assess
performance.491
488. See Consolidated Appropriations Act 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong.
§ 5002 (enacted) (mandating a report no later than 180 days after the bill’s
enactment detailing estimates, inventory, and recommendations regarding a
variety of issues pertaining to carbon removal).
489. See ZCAP, supra note 90, at 119; Marc Heller, Farmers Say They Can
Do More on Climate—If Congress Helps, FARMS.COM (Mar. 1, 2021),
https://perma.cc/W7M2-7SRU (describing how farmers can use regenerative
agriculture and conservation practices to cut down on GHG emissions, but will
need congressional regulatory support to do so).
490. See ELKIND ET AL., supra note 49, at 10–21; Beuttler et al., supra note
403, at 6. And while high costs have limited CCS’s role in mitigation efforts to
date, net zero goals may ultimately require full carbon capture by facilities
that burn fossil fuels and other major GHG emitters. Wendy B. Jacobs &
Michael Craig, Legal Pathways to Widespread Carbon Capture and
Sequestration, 47 ENV’T L. REP. 11022, 11030–31 (2018).
491. See NCI, NAVIGATING THE NUANCES, supra note 6, at 32.
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Enforcing private net zero targets is challenging because of
their voluntary, aspirational, and long-term nature. Various
mechanisms can nonetheless be brought to bear on companies
to follow through on their net zero pledges. Such mechanisms
include securities fraud litigation, actions under consumer
protection laws, contractual arrangements, and consumer and
investor pressure. Many of these mechanisms are just beginning
to be tested with respect to environmental sustainability claims.
Enforcing net zero commitments by governments is also
challenging, particularly for commitments not enshrined in law.
Statutory, constitutional, or human rights litigation may
nevertheless offer recourse in some countries, as a growing
number of climate change-related decisions suggest.
The net zero concept assumes that residual carbon
emissions will be counterbalanced by removal of carbon from the
atmosphere. The rush to adopt net zero pledges should not
obscure important differences between carbon removal and
carbon mitigation with respect to verifiability, permanence,
readiness, and risks. Distinguishing carbon mitigation and
carbon removal in net zero goals is essential to avoid
undermining efforts to achieve climate goals, shifting the
burdens of climate action to vulnerable populations or future
generations, and increasing societal, health, and environmental
risks.

